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THE SENSE AND NONSENSE OF




Imagine that you are about to go shopping at your local grocery store
and as you cross the threshold you spy a sign, posted somewhat
inconspicuously above the door, which reads:
TERMS OF USE
You are entering a retail establishment owned by ACME
2
Stores, Inc. Everything in this store is owned by ACME or
presented on consignment by third parties under an
agreement between ACME and various third parties. Your
ability to visit this store and use the information and
products that you witness herein is limited to the uses
specified by this agreement. You are hereby granted
permission to walk down the aisles of the store and to collect
goods to be purchased provided that you promise to be
careful and to pay for such goods as you exit. You hereby
acknowledge that ACME owns everything in the store,
including but not limited to all merchandise, store displays,
color schemes, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets and
proprietary and confidential rights and that you will not
copy, use, display, reverse engineer or otherwise infringe
such rights without the express written permission of
ACME. You also agree that ACME may use your image in
advertising and that in the event of any lawsuit arising out of
your visit to this store, ACME can only be sued where its
principal place of business is located.
Imagine further that under applicable law the sign is not just a
declaration of existing law but an attempt to change the effects of established
Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, L.L.M.,
University of California, Boalt Hall School of Law, J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law, B.A., University of California. Berkeley. I would like to thank my research
assistant, Kris Huether, for her invaluable assistance, and Anne Schmiege for her editorial
oversight. I would also like to thank my colleague, Professor Linda Rusch, for providing her
comments on multiple drafts of this article.
2 As used herein, "ACME" is a fictional retail establishment. Use of the term is
an ode to Roadrunner cartoons in which Wile E. Coyote uses a variety of Acme products in an
attempt to catch the Roadrunner.
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law. Would you cross the threshold if it meant you were contractually bound
to accept less protection for physical injuries if you should slip and fall in the
store? Would you cross the threshold if it precluded you from suing ACME
in a local court of your choosing? Would you cross the threshold if doing so
meant that you were authorizing ACME to use your image in its
commercials? Would you cross the threshold if it meant that ACME could
collect information about your buying habits and sell it to others? Would you
cross the threshold if doing so meant you were exposing yourself to an
increased risk of criminal liability?
As surprising as the foregoing scenario sounds, the fictional sign
posted by ACME is not unlike the "terms of use agreements" (TOUs) that
appear at the bottom of many web sites When you "click" on those
highlighted terms, you are linked to a standard-form contract in which web
site operators (WSOs) attempt to define the legal relationship that exists
between themselves and visitors to their sites. In many cases, TOUs are
simply an effort to resolve uncertainties that exist in the law. In other cases,
they seek to fundamentally alter well-established principles of law and,
arguably, the legitimate expectations of consumers.
This article examines the purpose, use and enforceability of TOUs.4
In so doing it looks beyond the common question of whether TOUs are
enforceable to ask whether and under what circumstances TOUs are
necessary. Since the hypothetical sign of ACME is not common while TOUs
have become ubiquitous, this article explores whether the nature of the
Internet is so different from the brick-and-mortar world that TOUs are
needed for web sites but not for retail stores.
A review of many of the existing TOUs reveals that major
differences exist in the number and nature of their provisions. On one
extreme are the TOUs of companies like Disney, Barnes and Noble and
Amazon that apparently seek to address all possible contingencies and risks
3 Other names for these agreements include "site license" and "conditions of use
agreement." Similar licenses used in connection with the distribution and sale of software are
often called "end-user-license agreements" ("EULAs'). Although this article focuses on
licenses that are designed to govern the use of web sites, many of the same issues that are
discussed herein are applicable to EULA's.
4 Unless otherwise indicated, the legal issues to be discussed herein focus on the
laws that are generally applicable in the United States and upon TOUs that were in use as of
late 2002 and early 2003. Although significant international and state laws related to e-
commerce will be mentioned as appropriate, no attempt is made herein to analyze the laws of
every country of the world or of every state of the United States. Additionally, although
various provisions of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) will be
referenced on occasion, because UCITA has only been adopted in two states, it is not the
focus of the analysis. Attorneys who are advising their clients about TOUs should become
familiar with any state or foreign laws that may apply to their clients' sites and consider how
their clients' business models and web sites can be designed to limit any problems that are
posed by such laws.
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whether they are likely or not.5 On the other extreme are the web sites of LL.
Bean, Land's End and Tower Records that do not have TOUs per se, but
instead rely on default rules, online instructions, and the documentation that
is produced as part of a sales transaction to govern the relationship with their
customers. In between are the TOUs of Microsoft, eBay, Google and Sears
that address some issues but not others.6
As with any contract, there are a number of factors that will dictate
the recommended complexity of a TOU. To answer the question of whether a
specific provision of a TOU is needed requires an appreciation of the goals
of the WSO, knowledge of the default rules that may apply to the operation
of the site, and an understanding of the nature and location of the audience to
whom the site is directed.7 The more interactive and content-rich a web site
is, the more legal issues that will arise from its operation. For instance, a web
site that allows third-party content to be posted must be concerned about
potential liability flowing from such postings. 8 If a web site is targeted to
foreign consumers, the requirements of foreign laws and the possibility of
being sued in a foreign country must be considered. 9 Similarly, where a site
is targeted to children, the requirements of the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act'0 must be met.
5 Disney Online, Terms of Use, at
http://disney.go.com/legal/conditions-of use.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003); Barnes &
Noble, Terms of Use, at
http://www.barnesandnoble.com/include/terms-of use.asp?userid=6WPF6GYMXO (last
visited Mar. 16, 2003); Amazon, Conditions of Use, at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/508088/104-2353956-1239901 (last visited
Mar. 16, 2003).
6 Microsoft, Information on Terms of Use, at
http://www.microsoft.com/info/cpyright.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003); eBay, User
Agreement, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/png-user.html (last visited Oct. 7,
2002); Google, Google Terms of Service, at http://www.google.com/terms-of service.htm
(last visited Mar. 16, 2003); Sears, Terms & Conditions/Safety Notice, at
http://www.sears.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). A common feature of all listed web sites is
that they are accessible to web browsers without a need to pre-register. The absence of any
registration process means that visitors to the sites are not required to affirmatively agree to
the posted TOUs, but rather are said to consent to the terms of the TOUs simply by logging
onto the site. There may, however, be points during the use of a site where a web site user will
be asked to affirmatively "click-to-agree" to the terms of a general TOU or to the terms of an
agreement that is intended to govern a more traditional transaction. For instance, on the eBay
site, once a web site user decides that he wants to bid on or sell an item, he must go through a
registration process.
7 As with the relationship that exists between ACME and its customers, many
well-established principles of law already exist to govern the relationship between WSOs and
their customers. For instance, established principles of contract law, including the Uniform
Commercial Code, govern the sale of goods. Intellectual property laws protect copyrights,
patents, trademarks, and trade secrets. Established jurisdictional rules and choice of law
principles dictate where an injured customer can sue and what law will apply to the claims.
8 See discussion infra Section III.B.iii.
9 See discussion infra Section 1ll.B.vi.
10 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000).
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This article begins with a brief discussion of the history of the
Internet and the apparent origins of TOUs. Although it is odd to speak of the
"historic" use of TOUs when the commercial use of the Internet is barely a
decade old,' the origins of TOUs shed some light on the importance, or lack
thereof, of several common provisions of TOUs. Significantly, because
TOUs are an obvious extension of the "shrink-wrap', 12 practices of the
software industry, the question arises whether software licenses are a good
model for TOUs both from the perspective of their content and
enforceability.
The justifications for and uses of TOUs are brought into sharper
focus in Section III of this article when nine common, but by no means
uniform, provisions of TOUs are examined. Although the content and
organization of TOUs can vary greatly, TOU provisions can generally be
divided into two basic categories: (I) representations, disclosures and
instructions; and (2) user rights and obligations. The foregoing categorization
was devised in order to distinguish between those provisions that are merely
informational, or reflect the representations and promises of the WSO, and
those provisions that seek either to impose affirmative duties on web site
users or modify the rights of such users. Arguably, the latter category
requires the assent of web site users while the former category does not.
Finally, in Section IV of this article, the enforceability of TOUs is
explored from three perspectives. First, traditional principles of mutual
assent are discussed to determine whether the typical "browse-wrap" TOU is
likely to constitute a binding agreement.' 3 Second, TOUs are examined
through the lens of the doctrine of unconscionability to determine if they are
II Early rules governing the Internet prohibited it from being used for commercial
purposes, but in 1991 the National Science Foundation (NSF) lifted the restriction on
commercial use, thereby paving the way for e-commerce. See PBS, Life on the Internet:
Timeline, at http://www.pbs.org/intemet/timeline/timeline-txt.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2003).
Online advertising is said to have started on October 27, 1994, when Hotwired, the online
version of Wired magazine, signed up fourteen advertisers for its debut. See BARBARA K.
KAYE & NORMAN J. MEDOFF, JUST A CLICK AWAY: ADVERTISING ON THE INTERNET 6 (2001).
12 As explained by the court in ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447, 1449
(7th Cir. 1996), "[t]he 'shrinkwrap license' gets its name from the fact that retail software
packages are covered in plastic or cellophane 'shrinkwrap,' and some vendors ... have
written licenses that become effective as soon as the customer tears the wrapping from the
package."
13 Browse-wrap agreements are to be distinguished from the so-called "click-
through" or "click-wrap" agreements. See Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-Through
Agreements: Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 Bus. LAW., 401, 401
(2001).
In [click- through] agreements, one party sets up a proposed electronic
form agreement to which another party may assent by clicking an icon or
a button or by typing in a set of specified words. Click-through
agreements are distinct from "click-free agreements" (also known as
"browse-wrap agreements"), in which the User does not manifest
unambiguous assent to the posted terms.
Id. Such terms are derived from the term "shrink-wrap license."
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likely to meet minimal levels of procedural and substantive fairness. Finally,
a number of issues that are discussed throughout the article are reviewed in
light of the principle that courts will refuse to enforce contractual provisions
that conflict with public policy.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET, E-COMMERCE
AND TERMS OF USE AGREEMENTS
The Internet14 as we know it today, with its multitude of "cyber-
places,"' 5 web sites and communication capabilities, is the result of a
convergence of a number of developments. First, and most obviously, is the
development of the computer and telecommunications technologies that
make Internet communications possible. Related to this was the
establishment by the United States military in 1969 of a networked system of
computers called "ARPANet"' 6 and the subsequent development of other
government-subsidized computer networks.17
'4 Although in common usage the term "the Internet" has come to mean a place
where people go to obtain information and communicate with others, technically it refers to an
"international network of interconnected computers." See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849
(1997). The term is defined in several federal statutes as "the combination of computer
facilities and electromagnetic transmission media, and related equipment and software,
comprising the interconnected world-wide network of computer networks that employ the
Transmission Protocol/Interet Protocol or any successor protocol to transmit information."
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(4) (2000).
15 As noted by Lawrence Lessig, cyberspace consists of a number of different
"cyber-places" or "communities" where online interactions can occur: "Cyberspace is not a
place. It is many places. The character of these many places is not identical." LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 63 (1999).
16 As initially configured, ARPANet connected a mere handful of mainframe
computers located at various universities in the United States. See Barry M. Leiner et al., A
Brief History of the Internet, at http://www.isoc.org/intemet/history.brief.shtnl (last visited
Jan. 27, 2003).
[ARPANET] came together in September 1969 when [Bolt Beranek and
Newman] installed the first [Interface Message Processor] at UCLA and
the host computer was connected .... Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
provided the second node .... Two more nodes were added at UC Santa
Barbara and University of Utah.
Id.
17 See PBS, Life on the Internet. Tineline, supra note I I (referencing the
development of ALOHANET, THEORYNET and USENET). One such network, a large
government-subsidized network known as NSFNET, was subject to an "Acceptable Use
Policy" promulgated by the National Science Foundation (NSF). See Leiner et al., supra note
16.
On the NSFNET Backbone - the national-scale segment of NSFNET -
NSF enforced an "Acceptable Use Policy" (AUP) which prohibited
Backbone usage for purposes "not in support of Research and Education."
The predictable (and intended) result of encouraging commercial network
traffic at the local and regional level, while denying its access to national-
scale transport, was to stimulate the emergence and/or growth of
504 [Vol. 26:3
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Another factor that led to the Internet of today is the general
public's use and acceptance of text-based electronic communications in the
form of e-mail, newsgroups and chat-rooms. 8 While the use of ARPANet
and other government subsidized networks was initially limited to the
defense, research and education communities, private industry and private
citizens were not precluded from using similar technology to create their own
networks. Thus, even before the Internet came into prominence, online
service pioneers such as Prodigy, CompuServe and AOL enabled millions of
people to engage in computer-based communications through the use of
bulletin board systems.' 9
With the development of each new computer network and
improvements to network technologies and communication protocols, the
speed and sophistication of Internet communications improved. Initially, the
bandwith and communication protocols of early computer networks limited
messages to plain text.20 But eventually new protocols for exchanging data
were developed to allow the transmission of graphic, video and audio files.
Of particular significance was the development in 1991 of the hypertext
transfer protocol (HTTP) and hypertext markup language (HTML).2'
Developed at CERN22 by Tim Bemers-Lee, the practical importance of
HTTP and HTML was that they made the transferability and accessibility of
information on the Internet easier and led to the creation of "the World Wide
Web., 23 The decision by the National Science Foundation in 1991 to lift
"private", competitive, long-haul networks such as PSI, UUNET, ANS
CO+RE, and (later) others.
Id.
Is Of course, text-based electronic communications are not new but began with
the advent of the electronic telegraph in the late 1800's. For a history of the telegraph, see
TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET (1998).
19 For a summary of the state of technology and computer communications before
1995, see Eric Schlacter, Cyberspace, The Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas:
Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 87, 89-111 (1993) ("At the heart of the BBS [bulletin board system] is a central
computer, set up and operated by the system operator (commonly called the 'sysop'). Users
link their computers to the central BBS by modem."), and Mark L. Gordon & Diana J.P.
McKenzie, A Lawyer's Roadmap of the Information Superhighway, 13 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 177, 181-85 (1995) ("[T]he number of on-line subscribers has
skyrocketed from .96 million in 1988 to an estimated 5.1 million in 1993, an increase of over
500 percent in five years.").
20 LESSIG, supra note 15, at 64 ("At the start of the Internet, communication was
through text. Media such as USENET newsgroups, Internet Relay Chat, and e-mail all
confined exchange to text - to words on a screen, typed by a person (or so one thought).").
21 Id. at 103.
22 "CERN" is an acronym for the Centre Europ~en de Recherche Nuclear, now
the European Organization for Nuclear Research.
23 Newton's Telecom Dictionary defines the World Wide Web as:
the universe of accessible information available on many computers
spread through the world and attached to that gigantic computer network
called the Internet. The Web has a body of software, a set of protocols and
a set of defined conventions for getting at the information on the Web.
2003)
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restrictions on the commercial use of the NSFnet backbone, and the
subsequent cancellation of subsidies for the NSFnet system, are often hailed
as the ultimate events leading to the widespread commercial use of the
Internet.24
The first companies to take advantage of the commercial potential of
the Internet and engage in "e-commerce" 2 did so without many Internet-
specific laws to guide them.26 The uncertainties that arose from the absence
The Web uses hypertext and multimedia techniques to make the web easy
for anyone to roam, browse and contribute to.
HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY (18th ed. 2002). Mr. Bemers-Lee
explained:
In 1980 1 played with programs to store information with random links,
and in 1989, while working at the European Particle Physics Laboratory, I
proposed that a global hypertext space be created in which any network-
accessible information could be refered [sic] to by a single "Universal
Document Identifier". . . . The dream behind the Web is of a common
information space in which we communicate by sharing information. Its
universality is essential: the fact that a hypertext link can point to
anything, be it personal, local or global, be it draft or highly polished.
There was a second part of the dream, too, dependent on the Web being so
generally used that it became a realistic mirror (or in fact the primary
embodiment) of the ways in which we work and play and socialize.
Tim Bemers-Lee, The World Wide Web: A Very Short Personal History, available at
http://www.w3.org/People/Bemers-Lee/ShortHistory.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
24 See Leiner et al., supra note 16 ("NSF's privatization policy culminated in
April, 1995, with the defunding of the NFSNET Backbone. The funds thereby recovered were
(competitively) redistributed to regional networks to buy national-scale Internet connectivity
from the now numerous, private, long-haul networks."). See also JANE K. WIwN & BENJAMIN
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 1.02 (4th ed. 2002).
2S "The term E-commerce seems to have been coined in the mid-1990's when the
Internet had just begun to capture the attention of the larger public." WIN N & WRIGHT, supra
note 24, § 1.02. As used herein the term "e-commerce" refers broadly to the use of the Internet
to advertise and promote business and to buy and sell goods and services over the Internet. It
is to be distinguished from the terms "e-business" and "electronic commerce." Id.
Although the terms e-Business, E-Commerce, and electronic commerce
are sometimes used interchangeably, they reflect different ideas about
what impact new information technologies will have on a basic business
operation. The idea of electronic commerce gained currency 20 or 30
years ago when networked systems of computers first were used to
execute transactions. Electronic funds transfers, electronic clearing and
settlement of securities trades, and electronic contracting transactions
were among the first electronic commerce systems implemented .... The
term e-Business was coined in the late 1990s and usually indicates a
broader focus than the term E-commerce. If E-Commerce is about
executing transactions more efficiently in broader marketplaces defined
by new communications technologies, then e-Business is about a thorough
restructuring of business operations within an organization to take full
advantage of a wide range of new information technologies.
Id.
26 In the early 1990s, procedures were in place whereby individuals and
companies could obtain domain names, but most of the law that now governs domain names
was not developed until years later. See generally WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 24, §
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of such laws together with the technological and boundary-less nature of the
Internet resulted in a variety of strategies to make the Internet environment
more predictable.27 Because use of the Internet was initially limited to a
small group of researchers and educators, so-called "netiquette" played a key
-role in controlling the early use of the Internet.28 As use of the Internet
expanded, however, it became clear that other strategies were required. With
the history of the software license as a backdrop, a desire to contract around
uncertainties led to the use of TOUs. 29 However, what began as relatively
11.03[D]. General laws applicable to Internet technology and content, such as copyright and
patent laws, existed but in light of the then recent Supreme Court decision in Feist
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., copyright law offered little protection for the
compilation of factual information contained in most web sites. 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
Cases like Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995), and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL
323710, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), highlighted the possibility that Internet service
providers could be held responsible for defamatory and infringing messages posted by
subscribers.
27 LESSIG, supra note 15, at 39 ("The significance of the recent birth of e-
commerce is that it takes place on an open, unsecured network. The challenge for commerce
on the early Net was to develop architectures that, while sharing in the network advantages of
the Internet, would restore some of the security that commerce requires."). For a summary of
the uncertainties as they existed in 1993, see David Loundy, E-Law:Legal Issues Affecting
Computer Information Systems and System Operator Liability, 12 COMPUTER/L.J. 101 (1993).
28 See Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JuRimETRiCS J. 311, 313
(1995).
Throughout much of its history, an unwritten but very powerful set of
informal norms has governed the Internet. These norms range from the
mundane (the use of capital letters in electronic mail is considered the
virtual equivalent of shouting; *asterisks* are used to underline or
emphasize a word) to the fundamental (unsolicited advertising which
intrudes on Net citizens is strictly forbidden). These norms are "enforced"
in a variety of ways, including "frequently asked question lists" which
inculcate new users into the culture of a particular subset of the Internet
community and "flames" (angry responses to breaches of Internet
etiquette, or "netiquette").
Id.
29 The use of software licenses can be traced back to the 1960's. At that time, the
state of copyright and patent law was such that the software developers doubted whether
either body of law would provide sufficient protection against the wholesale copying of
computer code. Because much of the software being developed at the time was specially
comnmissioned, the contract between a software developer and his client became the perfect
vehicle for protecting the software. Typically, such agreements contained language that
designated the software as a "trade secret" and required the licensee to maintain its
confidentiality. See generally David Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970); Richard Raysman, Protection of Proprietary Software In the
Computer Industry: Trade Secrets As an Effective Method, 18 JURIMETRICS J. 335 (1978);
Michael C. Gemignani, Legal Protection for Computer Software: The View from '79, 7
RRUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 269 (1979); Note, Computer Programs and Proposed
Revisions of the Patent and Copyright Laws, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1541 (1968). See also Mark A.
Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.R. 1239 (1995)
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meaningless notices on some e-mail messages and web pages has evolved
into a lengthy morass of provisions.
30
M. ANALYZING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF TERMS OF USE
AGREEMENTS
It is not possible in this article to detail all of the provisions of the
TOUs that are currently in use, but the issues that are typically addressed can
generally be segregated into two categories: (1) representations, disclosures
and instructions; and (2) user rights and obligations. Within these two basic
categories are a number of sub-categories, some of which are analyzed in
detail in the discussion that follows.
A. Representations, Disclosures and Instructions
As is discussed in Section IV of this article, a lot of attention is
focused on the issue of whether "browse-wrap" TOUs are enforceable.
However, several common provisions of TOUs do not seek either to impose
affirmative obligations on web site users or limit their pre-existing rights
and, thus, they need not be included in an "agreement." A summary of three
of these provisions follows.
1. Explanatory Provisions
In addition to spawning a new way of communicating, the Internet
has spawned many new ways of conducting business. One of the challenges
facing WSOs who devise new Internet-based business models is the need to
explain the nature and purpose of their services.3' Such explanatory
(describing the history of shrinkwrap licenses and the key provisions thereof, including: (1)
proprietary rights clauses; (2) limitations on warranties; and (3) limitations on user rights).
30 In Shrinkwrap in Cyberspace, Lemley describes early uses of TOUs:
[O]ne law firm's 'home page' on the World Wide Web restricts the ability
of companies to link to the home page if the linking company charges its
users for the privilege. Another law firm includes a 'contract' at the
bottom of its electronic mail messages prohibiting the copying,
distribution, and disclosure of the message [or] its contents and the 'taking
of any action in reliance on the contents' of the message. Furthermore,
large Internet access providers are including electronic 'terms and
conditions' for the general use of their services and for access to specific
databases.
Lemley, Shrinkwrap in Cyberspace, supra note 28, at 316.
31 A similar challenge faced the software industry. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz
& Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335, 346 (1996) (discussing the value of end user license
agreements (EULAs) from the perspective of Microsoft's attorneys). "EULAs place valuable
information in the hands of end users." Id.
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provisions often take the form of mere instructions, 32 but in other cases they
are more detailed and attempt to limit the legal obligations of the WSO. The
e-Bay TOU provides a perfect example of the latter strategy. It states, in
pertinent part:
eBay is a Venue.... eBay is not an Auctioneer. Although
we are commonly referred to as an online auction web
site, it is important to realize that we are not a traditional
"auctioneer." Instead, our site acts as a venue to allow
anyone to offer, sell, and buy just about anything .... We
are not involved in the actual transaction between buyers and
sellers. As a result, we have no control over the quality,
safety or legality of the items advertised, the truth or
accuracy of the listings, the ability of sellers to sell items or
the ability of buyers to buy items. We cannot ensure that a
buyer or seller will actually complete a transaction.33
The legal obligations that are imposed on individuals and companies
are often dictated by how a given relationship or transaction is
characterized. 34 Although self-serving characterizations are not determinative
of the laws that apply to a given situation, since many principles of law are
based upon the expectations of the parties, a common sense solution to the
question of how to characterize a relationship is to define it oneself. This is
the apparent purpose of the explanatory provisions contained in eBay's TOU.
Given the appearance of the eBay site, and particularly before the limited
functions of Internet auction sites were understood by the general public, it
would be easy to believe that eBay is the owner of the goods being sold on
its site. If such were the case, eBay could potentially be held liable for
injuries stemming from the sale of defective products or from
32 See, e.g., Excite, Terms of Service, Overview, at
http://wwwl.excite.com/home/companyinfo-excite/excite-terms/0,20406,,00.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003) ("Excite is a multi-purpose service which allows you to use or access a
wealth of products and services, including e-mail, search services, chat rooms and bulletin
boards, shopping services, news, financial information and broad range of other content
(collectively the 'Excite Service').")
3 eBay, Terms of Use, supra note 6, 3, 3.1.
34 Under well-established principles of tort law, for instance, a landlord has
certain duties of care that must be met and which are difficult or impossible to contract away.
See 4 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY & LITIGATION, ch. 39
(rev. 2d ed. 2002) (discussing principles of premises liability); 4 LEE & LINDAHL, supra, §
39:41 (discussing duties of landlords and tenants); 2 LEE & LINDAHL, supra, § 22:3
(discussing exculpatory contracts in leases). Similarly, if a transaction is characterized as a
sale of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), rather than general principles of
contract law, governs the transaction and limits the ways in which warranties can be
disclaimed. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to -316 (2002).
2003]
HAMLINE LA WREVIEW
misrepresentations made about the goods.3 It might also be held responsible
for the failure of the goods to be delivered as promised. Another concern that
apparently influenced the language of eBay's TOU is the fact that traditional
auction activities are regulated in many states.36 In an effort to avoid such
laws, eBay explains how it is different from the sorts of traditional auction
activities that are often subject to regulation.
While explanatory provisions like eBay's can be used to educate
consumers about the nature of a site, they are not necessary if the purpose of
a site is already understood. Thus, before including detailed explanatory
provisions in TOUs there should be a reasonable basis for believing that web
site users will misapprehend the nature of the site. If such provisions are
used, there is no need for them to be agreed to by web site users since they
merely describe the nature and purpose of a web site and do not require web
site users either to give up existing rights or to perform a specified
obligation. However, as a representation by the WSO that may be relied
upon by web site users, care must be taken to ensure that explanatory
provisions do not contain promises that cannot be met.38
2. Intellectual Property Notices
A common feature of most web sites and many TOUs are intellectual
property notices. Some WSOs post simple intellectual property notices on
the home pages of their sites. Others include links to separate intellectual
property notice pages. Still others place the notice provisions in TOUs. For
instance, the TOU of the Walt Disney Internet Group (WDIG) contains the
following language:
All materials contained in any WDIG Site . . . are the
copyrighted property of Disney Enterprises, Inc. or its
35 With respect to potential products liability, see 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note
34, ch. 27. With respect to potential liability for misrepresentation, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2000) (corresponds to Lanham Act, §43(a)). See also 3 LEE & LNDAHL, supra note 34, §
27.56 ("The general policy of strict liability is to bring within its scope all those who play any
part in putting a defective product into the stream of commerce.").
36 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1812.600 (West 2003).
37 Of course, e-Bay's explanation alone will not prevent the regulation of its
activities if, in fact, it falls within the statutory definition of the regulated enterprise.
38 See Larry W. Smith, A Survey of Current Legal Issues Arising From Contracts
For Computer Goods and Services, I COMPUTER/ L.J. 475, 478-79 (1979) ("Despite their
technical sophistication, the same basic marketing strategies are usually followed in selling
computer systems as with other large ticket items. What is said and done during the early
stages of this marketing activity can have a profound impact on subsequent questions of legal
liability."). Similarly, UCITA §420(a)(1) states: "An affirmation of fact or promise made by
the licensor to its licensee, including by advertising, which relates to the information and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the information to be
furnished under the agreement will conform to the affirmation or promise." UCITA §
420(a)(1) (2002). But see UCITA § 406(a) (2002) ("Words or conduct relevant to the creation
of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to disclaim or modify an express
warranty must be construed wherever reasonable and consistent with each other.").
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subsidiary or affiliated companies and/or third party
licensors. All trademarks, service marks, and trade names
are proprietary to Disney Enterprises, Inc. or its affiliates.a9
Except for the notice requirements that are applicable to works of
authorship created before March 1, 1989,40 notice is not technically required
to either establish or preserve patent, copyright and trademark rights. More
importantly, where a WSO wants to enjoy the benefits that flow from
intellectual property notices, it is important that the form and location of the
notices meet statutory requirements. Simple references to "patent, copyright,
and trademark rights" contained in a definition of rights clause may not
suffice.4'
Since the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989, notice
of copyright is no longer required for works published under the 1976
Copyright Act.42 However, a number of benefits are derived from such
notice.43 Most importantly, a copyright notice precludes a defendant in a
copyright infringement action from asserting the innocent infringement
defense."4 Similarly, while U.S. law does not mandate the use of a trademark
notice, failure to use a notice with respect to registered marks will limit the
damages that can be claimed in a trademark infringement action.45 In the
case of patents, so-called "patent marking" is only mandated for patented
articles that are being sold and is not required at all for patented methods and
39 Disney Online, Terms of Use, Restrictions on Use of Materials, supra note 5.
4o If a web site contains works that were created before March 1, 1989, care must
be taken to include an appropriate copyright notice in order to ensure that such works do not
enter the public domain. See 2 MELVIlLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT §§ 7.12[C][2], [D] (1978 & Supp. 2002).
41 "It should here be noted... that a mere statement on the work that copyright
protection is claimed, or words to that effect, will not serve the purpose of a valid copyright
notice if the technical requirements of form and placement are not observed." 2 NIMMER,
supra note 40, § 7.05 (citing Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428 n. 5 (1891)).
42 See U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 3, Copyright Notice (1999), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ03.pdf, see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 7.02[B].
Nimmer notes:
The Berne Convention bars notice, along with all formalities, from
serving as a condition to copyright protection. Under the current [U.S.
copyright] (A]ct as enacted in 1976, notice served that proscribed function
of being a condition to U.S. Copyright. Therefore, in order to bring the
United States into conformity with Berne, Congress prospectively
eliminated the mandatory notice requirement.
Id.
43 U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 3, supra note 42, at 2 ("Use of the notice may
be important because it informs the public that the work is protected by copyright, identifies
the copyright owners, and shows the year of first publication.").
Id.
45 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000) (stating that no profits and no damages will be
awarded unless defendant has actual notice).
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processes.4' Furthermore, the only consequence of a failure to mark a
patented article is a limitation on potential damage claims.47
Generally, the components of a proper copyright notice under U. S.
law are: (1) the © symbol, the word "Copyright," or the abbreviation
"Copr."; (2) the year of first publication; and (3) the name of the owner of
the copyright.48 Also, a copyright notice must be "affixed" (i.e., attached) to
the work of authorship "in such manner and location as to give reasonable
notice of the claim of copyright. '"9 A proper patent notice will consist of the
word "patented" or the abbreviation "pat." and the patent number. s A
trademark notice can take several forms. If a mark is unregistered, the use of
the "tm" or "sm" symbols in close proximity to the mark is recommended.5'
If a mark is, registered, the words "Registered in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office," an abbreviation of the foregoing, or the ® symbol should
be used.2
Because web sites are often a compilation of information, part of
which may not be protected by copyright and part of which may be owned
by someone other than the WSO, special notice requirements may apply. For
instance, 17 U.S.C. § 403 states that if a work consists predominantly of one
or more works of the United States (which under 17 U.S.C. § 105 are not
protected by copyright), the notice of copyright must include a statement that
identifies those portions of the work that are protected or, alternatively, a
legend such as: "No claim of copyright is made for the works of the United
States Government." With respect to derivative and collective works that
incorporate pre-existing works that were created after March 1, 1989, it will
generally suffice to include only a notice of copyright that pertains to the
46 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2000); see also 7 DONALD S. CISUM, CI4SUM ON PATENTS §
20.0317][xii] (1999).
35 U.S.C. § 287; see also 7 CmisuM, supra note 46, § 20.03 [7][c][ii] (quoting
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)) ("The availability of
damages in an infringement action is made contingent upon affixing a notice of patent to the
patented article.").
48 See 2 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 7.05.
49 See 2 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 7.10[C] (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(c), 402(c)
(2000)). Pursuant to Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(g) (2002), a
notice that is displayed at the web site user's terminal at sign-in or that is continuously on
display on the terminal should constitute effective notice. The cited regulation concerns
"works reproduced in machine-readable copies" and does not specifically refer to web sites.
Thus, because pursuant to 37 CFR § 201.20 the examples of acceptable notice that are given
are not exhaustive, the placement of copyright notices in other locations may be adequate.
However, compliance with the foregoing regulation conclusively establishes that reasonable
notice of copyright has been given. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 7.10.
'o 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000).
51 As noted by Thomas McCarthy, the benefits. of trademark notices for
unregistered marks include their educational function and the fact that they act as a sort of "no
trespassing sign." Use of such notices can also serve as evidence on the issue of priority of use
and help prevent a mark from becoming generic. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19.148 (4th ed. 1996).
52 15U.S.C.§!lIl (2000).
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entirety of the work." In other words, a separate copyright notice for all
works in a web site is not required. 4
In light of the foregoing, placing intellectual property notices in a
TOU seems at best superfluous. At worst, such a practice is ill-advised
because it may not give adequate notice of the rights claimed. Moreover,
there is no need for a web site user to "acknowledge" such notices or
otherwise "agree" to the document in which they appear. Obviously, The
Coca-Cola Company does not have to include a statement on its COKE
bottle that reads: "By opening this bottle and drinking its contents you agree
that Coca-Cola is the registered trademark of The Coca-Cola Company."
Including appropriately worded intellectual property notices in a prominent
location on a web site should suffice.
3. Required and Recommended Disclosures
TOUs often include what this article refers to as "required and
recommended disclosures." These disclosures differ from explanatory
provisions because they are intended either to meet disclosure requirements
that are imposed by law or to take advantage of benefits that can be derived
from discretionary disclosures. They also differ from intellectual property
notices because they do not involve intellectual property rights.
Depending upon the nature and purpose of a web site and the
underlying business that it reflects, there may be a myriad of laws that
govern its operation and require certain disclosures." A general article such
as this cannot identify all the disclosure requirements that exist in the law.
However, there are three types of disclosures that are of particular relevance
to the Internet: (1) the discretionary disclosures of the Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILL); 56 (2) the privacy policy
53 See 2 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 7.12[C][1].
Because a notice pertaining to a derivative or collective work suffices to
protect the pre-existing works published therein, it follows that the
existing practice of many publishers to include earlier copyright notices as
well as a notice for the newly published derivative or collective work is a
harmless, albeit unnecessary precaution.
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 401(a), (bX2)).
A "derivative work" is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works," and a "collective
work" is a work "in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent
works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
54 Although, according to U.S. copyright law, a separate copyright notice is not
required for all works of authorship contained in a collective work, it may be required by
contract. This is because the license agreements by which copyright holders allow their
materials to be used often contain copyright notice or attribution requirements.
55 For instance, the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires every consumer reporting
agency to, upon request of a consumer, disclose specified information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g
(2000). The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act requires all financial institutions to regularly disclose
their privacy policies and practices to their customers. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6803 (2000).
56 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,512(2000).
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disclosures mandated by the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA); 5' and (3) the privacy policy disclosures recommended by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and advocated by various privacy interest
groups.
58
A question that confronted early online service providers was
whether a company that provides interactive services - such as e-mail, chat
rooms, and bulletin board services - could be liable for copyright
infringement caused by subscribers and web site users. Online service
providers (including WSOs) are directly responsible for their unauthorized
use and posting of copyrighted works,59 but they did not want added liability
for infringing content posted by others. To ameliorate these concerns,
OCILL was adopted. It provides:
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
... for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement
of copyright by reason of the storage at the. direction of a
user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the
service provider -
(A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or
an activity using the material on the system or network
is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not
aware of facts or circumstances from which the
infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material; ... 60
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6502 (2000).
For a consumer watchdog's perspective on privacy issues, see Electronic
Privacy Center (EPIC) at http://www.epic.org. For the point of view of large WSOs, see
Online Privacy Alliance at http://www.privacyalliance.org.
'9 See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
60 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2000). As used in section 512(c)(1), "service provider"
means "a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor,
and includes an entity described in subparagraph (A)." 17 U.S.C § 512 (k)(1)(B). Section 512
(k)(I)(A) defines a "service provider" as "an entity offering the transmission, routing, or
providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points
specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of
the material sent or received." The precise contours of the definition of "service provider"
remain to be defined by case law; however, it appears that it would include any web site
operator who provides interactive online services. See Hendrickson v. Ebay, Inc., 165 F. Supp.
2d 1082 (C.D.Cal. 2001) (noting the "broad" definition of "service provider"); see also
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybemet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Costar
Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, 2002 Copr. L. Dec. P 28,500, 2002 WL 31006142 (N.D. Il1. Sept. 4, 2002).
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The foregoing limitations on liability do not apply unless a service
provider: (1) "does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity"; 61 (2) "upon notification of claimed infringement ...
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing"; 62 and (3) has designated an agent to receive
notifications of claimed infringement by posting a prescribed notice on its
web site. 3 The required notice must be included on the service provider's
web site in a location that is accessible to the public and must include the
name, address, phone number, and electronic mail address of the person
designated by the service provider to receive copyright infringement
complaints."
In addition to addressing the liability concerns of online service
providers, Congress has frequently addressed the interests of children.65
Although many provisions of these laws have been held unconstitutional on
free speech grounds,66 the provisions of the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA) remain intact. 67 According to COPPA, if a WSO
establishes a commercial web site that is "targeted" to children under the age
of thirteen, it must abide by a series of regulations that have been adopted by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
6
A web site or online service directed to children is generally required
to: (1) provide notice on the site of what information it collects from
children, how it uses the information, and its disclosure practices; (2) obtain
parental consent prior to the collection, use or disclosure of such
information; (3) provide a means for parental review of the information
collected from a child and to refuse to permit further use or maintenance of
such information; (4) not to condition any online activity on a child
61 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(l)(B).
62 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(l)(C).
63 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(2). When contrasted with the simple liability limiting
provisions that Congress enacted to resolve concerns about service provider liability for
defamatory and fraudulent statements, discussed in Section III.B.iii. of this article, it is
obvious that the stringent requirements of OCILL were the result of the more powerful lobby
of content owners.
6 Id. A copy of the notice must also be provided to the U.S. Copyright Office. Id.
For information on submitting the required information to the U.S. Copyright Office, see the
instructions and form that are posted at U.S. Copyright Office, Online Service Providers:
Designation by Service Provider of Agent for Notification of Claims of Infringement, at
http://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp(last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
63 See Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000); Child Online
Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 230, 231, 609 (2000); Child Pornography
Protection Act of 1996 (CPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000); Children's Interet Protection Act
(CIPA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 7001, 9134,47 U.S.C. §§ 254, 609, 902 (2000).
6 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (involving portions of the Communications
Decency Act); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002) (involving the Child
Pornography Protection Act); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002) (involving the Child
Online Protection Act).
67 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1) (2000).
68 15 U.S.C. § 6501(l), (10) (2000).
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disclosing personal information; and (5) establish reasonable procedures to
protect the confidentiality, security and integrity of the information
collected.69 The required notice must be clearly labeled and be posted on the
web site with "clear and prominent" links to the notice located on the home
page and "at each area on the website or online service where personal
information is collected from children. 70
For web sites that are not targeted to children, no generally
applicable federal law exists to require WSOs to post privacy policies.7'
Rather, the presence of privacy policies on the home pages of numerous web
sites is the result of efforts by the FTC and various public interest groups to
encourage a system of self-regulation. 72 The four core principles of privacy
protection are: notice, choice, access and security.73 The notice principle
requires data collectors to disclose their information practices to consumers
before collecting personal information. Then, if information will be used for
a purpose other than the purpose for which it was initially collected, the
consumer must be given the choice of whether and how the information is
used. Consumers must also be given access to their personal information so
they can review and contest its accuracy and completeness. Finally, all online
data collectors must take reasonable steps to protect the security and
accuracy of the information they collect.
Although the FTC Act generally prohibits unfair and deceptive
advertising, and the FTC has jurisdiction to enjoin a WSO from making any
false or misleading claims about its privacy policies, 74 except for its authority
69 16 CFR § 312.3.
70 16 CFR § 312.4(b).
71 A number of laws exist that require specific types of businesses to create
procedures for ensuring the privacy of certain information and the development and
dissemination of written privacy policies. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
6801-6803 (2000); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (Buckley Amendment), 20
U.S.C. § 1232g (2000); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000); Cable
Communications Privacy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000); Electronic Communications Privacy
Act , 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000); Video Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000); Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000); Driver's Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2721-2725 (2000); Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2000).
72 It may also be explained by the adoption of state laws or the laws of other
countries. See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
73 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (June
1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.htm.
74 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(l)-(2) (2000). In recent years, the FTC has initiated several
actions against companies for their alleged failure to abide by their own posted privacy
policies. See, e.g., Complaint, In the Matter of GeoCities, FTC File No. 9823015, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9902/9823015cmp.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2003); In the Matter
of Eli Lilly and Company, FTC File No. 0123214, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/01/lillycmp.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2003); In the Matter of
Microsoft Corporation, FTC File No: 0123240, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/08/microsoftcmp.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
[Vol. 26:3
WEB SITE TERMS OF USE
under COPPA, the FTC does not yet have specific authority to mandate
online privacy policies.75 Currently, the principal benefits to be derived from
posting a privacy policy are consumer goodwill and the associated marketing
benefits that may flow from "privacy seal programs., 76 Pursuant to these
programs, WSOs are given permission to use the certification marks of
various companies if they implement privacy policies that comport with the
four core privacy principles detailed above. The theory is that as the seals of
companies like TRUSTe, WebTrust and the Better Business Bureau (BBB
Online) become better known, consumers will have an easy way to
determine the privacy practices of WSOs and will refuse to conduct business
with companies that do not provide the level of privacy they desire.
While the acknowledgement by web site users of voluntary and
mandatory disclosures may be desired, with the exception of those portions
of COPPA that require parental consent, it is not necessary for a web site
user to "agree" to such provisions. In fact, given the length and obscurity of
many TOUs, it can be argued that disclosures that are included in TOUs are
not sufficiently clear and conspicuous to constitute effective notice." The
better practice is to include required and recommended disclosures in
separate, properly marked notices that can be readily located on a web site.
B. User Rights and Obligations
A fundamental principle of contract law is that if you want to impose
a contractual duty on someone (i.e., require someone to do something that
they are not otherwise required by law to do or require them to waive rights
that they enjoy under the law), they must be informed of the proposed
obligation and affirmatively assent thereto.78 While some aspects of the six
provisions that are discussed below may be merely declaratory of existing
75 In its May 2000 report to Congress, the FTC recommended legislation that
would "establish basic standards of practice for the collection of information online, and
provide an implementing agency with the authority to promulgate more detailed standards
pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act." Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online:
Fair Information Practices In the Electronic Marketplace (May 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). To date,
no such legislation has been enacted.
6 See Scott Killingsworth, Website Privacy Policies in Principle and in Practice,
in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE., PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND LITERARY
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, ECOMMERCE STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS IN THE DIGITAL
EcONOMY4Sept. 2000).
The FTC generally requires that all disclosures that are made in order to
prevent an ad from being deceptive or misleading must be clear and conspicuous. "In
evaluating whether disclosures are likely to be clear and conspicuous in online ads, advertisers
should consider the placement of the disclosure in the ad and its proximity to the relevant
claim." Federal Trade Commission, Dot Corn Disclosures, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2003).
78 See generally I E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.1
(2d ed. 1998); 17A AM. JuR. 2D Formation of Contracts §§ 16-28 (1991).
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law or informational, the bulk of the provisions appear to require affirmative
assent.
1. Definition of Rights Clause
A definition of rights clause (sometimes labeled "intellectual
property rights" clause, "proprietary rights" clause or "scope of rights"
clause) is designed to give notice of the rights that a WSO claims in the
materials that are accessible on its web site. Often it serves the benign
purpose of repeating in narrative form the description of copyrights, patent
rights and trademark rights that are contained in an intellectual property
notice. 9 For instance, Oracle's TOU has just one paragraph that appears
much like the information on the back of a can of Coca-Cola. It states:
"Copyright © 1995-2000, Oracle Corporation. All rights reserved" and
"Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation.""0 The definitions
of rights clauses contained in Microsoft's TOU include a provision that
purports to define the ownership of the "software that is made available for
download," a standard copyright notice and a provision that lists the
numerous trademarks owned by Microsoft."' Amazon's definition of rights
clause is more expansive, consisting not only of a listing of trademarks and
patents, but a copyright clause that attempts to identify all copyrightable
content on the site. 2
Despite the benefits that flow from simple copyright, trademark and
patent notices,83 a definition of rights clause is not needed to create such
rights. Copyrights, trademark rights, and patent rights either exist
independently of the TOU or they do not exist at all. 4 Moreover, where
79 See supra Section Ill.A.ii (discussing intellectual property notices).80 See Oracle, Terms of Use, at http://www.oracle.corrhtml/terms.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2003).
81 See Microsoft, Information on Terms of Use, supra note 6.
82 Such clause states:
All content included on this site, such as text, graphics, logos, button
icons, images, audio clips, digital downloads, data compilations, and
software, is the property of Amazon.com or its content suppliers and
protected by United States and international copyright laws. The
compilation of all content on this site is the exclusive property of
Amazon.com and protected by U.S. and international copyright laws. All
software used on this site is the property of Amazon.com or its software
suppliers and protected by United States and international copyright laws.
Amazon, Conditions of Use, supra note 5.
83 See discussion supra Section III.A.ii.
84 Discussing the predecessor to UCITA, Article 2B of the U.C.C., David
Nimmer et al. explained:
Contrary to the claim that Article 2B is needed to protect copyright
interests . . ., existing copyright law adequately protects those owners
when they distribute copyrighted mass market software, even in a world in
which shrinkwrap agreements are not deemed enforceable contracts. That
conclusion follows because the exclusive rights granted under the
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notice is recommended it does not need to be contained in a document (such
as a TOU) that purports to be an agreement.85 Thus, putting aside the
potential educational value of a definition of rights clause, to the extent it is
simply explanatory of existing law or is repetitive of intellectual property
notices, it is unnecessary.
Sometimes, however, definitions of rights clauses go beyond their
simple notice function and attempt to expand the scope of intellectual
property rights that a WSO rightly enjoys under copyright, patent, or
trademark law." For instance, the TOU of Barnes and Noble provides:
User acknowledges that barnesandnoble.com contains
information, data, software, photographs, graphics, videos,
typefaces, graphics, music, sounds, and other material
(collectively "Content") that are protected by copyrights,
trademarks, trade secrets, or other proprietary rights, and that
these rights are valid and protected in all forms, media and
technologies existing now or hereinafter developed. All
copyright laws effectively preclude use of computer software - to the
extent the Constitution and Congress accord a monopoly therein - without
the express or implied permission of the copyright owner.
When a copyright owner distributes its software, it is free to grant a
license extending only to specified uses, while excluding others.
Moreover, any such license does not require a bilateral contract. A simple,
unilateral statement by the copyright owner of the scope of its license
suffices.
David Nimmer et al. , The Metamorphosis of Contract Into Expand, 87 CAL. L.
REv. 17, 29-30(1999).
8S Id. See also supra Section III.A.ii (discussing intellectual property notices).
86 That such is the purpose of these clauses is made clear by Comment 1 to
section 105 of UCITA:
The transition from print to digital media has created new demands for
information. Because digital information is so easily copied, increased
attention has been focused on the formulation of rights in information in
order to encourage its creation and on the development of contracting
methods that enable effective development and efficient marketing of
information assets. Here, as in other parts of the economy, the
fundamental policy of contract law is to enforce contractual agreements.
At the same time, there remains a fundamental public interest in assuring
that information in the public domain is free for all to use from the public
domain and in providing access to information for public purposes such as
education, research, and fair comment. While the digital environment
increases the risk of unfair copying, the enforcement of contracts that
permit owners to limit use of information and the development of
technological measures have given the owners of information.
considerable means of enforcing exclusivity in the information they
produce and collect. This is true not only against those in contractual
privity with the owners, but also in some contexts against the world-at-
large.
UCITA § 105 cmt. 1 (2002).
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Content is copyrighted as a collective work under U.S.
copyright laws, and barnesandnoble.com owns a copyright
in the selection, coordination, arrangement, and
enhancement of such Content.
8 7
Under U.S. law it is unlikely that the entire contents of a web site are
protected by trademark, patent and copyright law. Trademark rights attach to
"any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof' that is
used to identify and distinguish one person's goods and services from
another's and do not attach to the contents of web sites.88 Patent rights, if any
exist, are limited to the invention described in the patent claims and in the
case of web sites are likely to consist of either a business-method8 9 or
software patent.90 Basic facts, such as the identity and price of goods being
sold or the dates and times of events, are not protected by either copyright
law or patent law.9' Ideas that are expressed on web sites and material that
has already entered the public domain are also not protected.92
Absent copyright, patent or trademark protection, the principal way
information can be protected under U.S. law is pursuant to trade secret law
and associated contract law doctrine.93 Thus, as with the Barnes and Noble
example set forth above, companies that include a broad definition of rights
clause in their TOUs are trying to contractually obligate users of their web
sites to protect what they claim as trade secrets. 94 This strategy, however,
87 Barnes & Noble, Terms of Use, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
88 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). A web site's design and organization could,
conceivably, be protected as trade dress, but even if such were the case, the entirety of the web
site would not be protected. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
See also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Should It Be a Free For All? The Challenge of Extending
Trade Dress Protection to the Look and Feel of Web Sites in the Evolving Internet, 49 AM. U.
L. REv. 1233 (2000).
89 See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert.denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
90 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983).
91 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991).
See also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 525390, 54 U.S.P.Q. 1344 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), in which the court found no actionable copyright claim resulting from
defendant's practice of merely copying factual data. ("While the expression, organization,
placement, etc., of the factual data may be protected, [defendant] is not alleged to have copied
the method of presentation, but rather to have extracted the factual data and presented it in its
own format."). Id. at *2.
92 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
93 It may also be protected under a theory of misappropriation, but based upon
the reasoning of Int'l News Service and NBA, such a claim only applies to the
misappropriation of so-called "hot news." See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215 (1918, NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (1997).
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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should not succeed in cases where access to the subject content is widespread
because information that has been disclosed to the public cannot be a trade
secret.95
Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),96 a trade secret has
two critical components: (1) it must be information that "derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to" the
public, and (2) it must be "the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy." 97 It is axiomatic that if information is
not subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy, it is not a trade
gecret.98 Although absolute secrecy is not required for trade secret protection
to exist, it is generally understood that the more widely information is
disseminated, the less likely it is to be a trade secret. 99
To counter the foregoing argument, a WSO like Barnes and Noble is
likely to argue that everyone who views information on its web site is under
95 In early commentaries on the use of trade secret law to protect computer
software it was often acknowledged that the strategy of designating software as a trade secret
would not continue to work once software was widely distributed. See, e.g., Miles R. Gilbume
& Ronald L. Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Generally and in the Mass
Market, 3 COMPUTER/L.J. 211, 229 (1982) ("Even if enforceable license agreements are
obtained from all end-users of mass-distributed software, an issue still exists as to whether or
not the mere fact of massive distribution is inconsistent with the 'secrecy' element of trade
secret protection."). In the Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (the "CONTU Report"), it is noted: "Although many proprietors
feel secure when using trade secrecy, there are several problems they must face with respect to
its use in protecting programs. Because secrecy is paramount, it is inappropriate for protecting
works that contain the secret and are designed to be widely distributed." Final Report of the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 17 (1978). More
recently, Raymond Nimmer stated:
As both a practical and a legal matter, there is a fundamental distinction
between information products generally disseminated and products of
limited distribution. In a general dissemination product, information is
placed in the public domain. No effective way exists to recall the
information from public use or to regulate access from public sources.
RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW 2.08[3][b] (1996). Thus, it would be folly for a
WSO to rely on a TOU to protect valuable trade secrets. The better course of action is not to
put such trade secrets on a publicly accessible web site in the first instance.
9 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act is currently applicable in forty-three of the
fifty United States plus the District of Columbia. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts
About the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, available at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited Apr.
10, 2003). Where it is not applicable, the Restatement of the Law of Torts is likely to apply.
Under the Restatement (First) of Torts, a trade secret is defined as "information which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
(1939).
97 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990);
see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 1997) (California's version of the UTSA).
98 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.03 (2002)
("Indispensable to an effective allegation of a trade secret is proof that the matter is, more or
less, secret.").
99 1d. § 1.07[2].
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a contractual obligation to maintain the secrecy of such information."° Of
course, this argument assumes that the TOU constitutes a binding and
enforceable contract in the first instance. Even if a binding contract results,
however, at some point information that is widely distributed loses its status
as a trade secret.' ' This is because "reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy"
does not simply mean that the trade secret owner engaged in efforts to create
a contractual duty of confidentiality, but also depends on whether the
information maintains some semblance of secrecy. Moreover, a
confidentiality agreement cannot operate to convert information that is
already in the public domain into a trade secret. 02 In other words, although
contractual restrictions can be cited as one example of reasonable efforts to
maintain secrecy, they can only preserve that secrecy which already exists.0 3
The inability of contract law to convert publicly available
information into a trade secret is not the only problem facing WSOs who
seek to implement a broad description of rights clause. There are also public
policy issues that must be considered' °4 First, trade secret law only escapes
preemption problems because it applies in very limited circumstances.'05
Therefore, the broader the trade secret rights asserted by a WSO, the more
likely it is that attempts to enforce those rights will be preempted by
copyright or patent law.'0 6 Second, although a broad definition of rights
100 See NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW, supra note 95, 1 3.11[2] (suggesting use of
this very strategy to protect information that is not otherwise protected by copyright law)
("The second rationale for controls over access to data in electronic form involves combining
efforts to protect the secrecy of the material coupled with establishing relationships that by
contract or other expectation restrict disclosure and use of the information.").
101 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supra note 98, §1.05[5] ("Where a piece of
software has been widely distributed, there arise concerns.., regarding how 'confidential' or
'secret' the software can really be."). The same, of course, can be said of widely distributed
web site content.
,02 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supra note 98, § 1.03 ("It is not the
characterization of the parties which establishes the existence of a trade secret."); § 1.04
("Although evidence of intensive and extensive efforts to maintain secrets may be probative,
that the information itself is a trade secret," the most elaborate secrecy, however, will not
elevate public knowledge to the status of a trade secret.").
103 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (holding that trade
secret law is not preempted by copyright law, in part because trade secret rights can be
destroyed by independent development). Thus, even if something begins as a trade secret
when it is the subject of an agreement between a WSO and web site user, it may cease to be a
trade secret in the future through no fault or action by the web site user.
104 See generally 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, ch. 5; see also discussion infra
Section IV.
105 Id. at 480-81; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 146-57 (1989).
'06 See generally Dennis S. Kariala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-
Line Licenses, 22 U. DAY. L. Rv. 511 (1997) (discussing the conflict between state contract
law and federal copyright law); Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra
note 29 (discussing attempts by software vendors to "opt-out" of intellectual property law
through restrictions of use provisions); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract, and
Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse
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clause may be of little actual legal significance, a WSO may nonetheless use
such a provision to scare unsophisticated web site users into limiting their
use of web site content. To the extent such content is unprotected by
intellectual property law, this strategy is not recommended because it may
constitute unfair competition or an illegal restraint of trade.'
0 7
With the foregoing in mind, definitions of rights clauses that are
motivated by a desire to expand the intellectual property rights of WSO's are
probably ineffectual for such purpose. The intellectual property rights in the
site either pre-exist the TOU or they do not. If the WSO owns information
and data that it wishes to protect under principles of trade secret law, it is
better not to post that information on the Internet than to rely on a TOU for
protection. At a minimum, a WSO should segregate the trade secret
information it makes available over the Internet from more general
information and establish special security measures and contracts to govern
access to such information. Information treated in this manner is more likely
to constitute a trade secret, and the duty of confidentiality specified in the
contract is more likely to be enforced because assent was manifested before
access to the trade secret is allowed.'08
2. Scope of Use/Restrictions on Use
Defining the rights claimed in a web site is only the first step a WSO
usually employs in an attempt to protect such content. The second step is to
define and limit how the web site and its contents can be used. This is
typically done in a clause that is variously labeled "site license," "scope of
Engineering, 53 U. PiTr. L. REv. 543 (1992) (examining whether restrictions on trade secret
law through various contractual provisions are enforceable by the state or preempted by
copyright and patent law); Mary Brandt Jensen, The Preemption of Shrinkwrap Licenses in the
Wake of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 8 COMPUrER/L.J. 157 (1988) (discussing the
principle of reemption as it applies to breach of contract claims); UCITA § 105 cmts. 2-3.
10 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L.R. 111 (1997) (noting that in addition to
preemption issues, contracts that attempt to expand intellectual property rights may constitute
copyright misuse or otherwise conflict with federal and state statutes); Roger E. Schecter, The
Unfairness of Click-On Software Licenses, 46 WAYNE L. REv. 1735 (2000) (arguing that
various terms contained in software licenses may violate the Federal Trade Commission Act's
prohibition against unfair trade practices). If a TOU is a contract as WSOs assert, then it may
be a "contract ... in restraint of trade or commerce" in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, or of similar state statutes. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 186 (1981) (noting that a contract in restraint of trade may violate public
policy).
108 See, e.g., Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the originator of a concept for a new tool could not state a cause of action for
trade secret infringement in the absence of a confidentiality agreement that pre-existed
disclosure).
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use" and "restrictions on use." '9 The TOU of AOL includes an example of
one such clause. It provides, in pertinent part:
Amazon.com grants you a limited license to access and
make personal use of this site and not to download (other
than page caching) or modify it, or any portion of it, except
with express written consent of Amazon.com. This license
does not include any resale or commercial use of this site or
its contents; any collection and use of any product listings,
descriptions, or prices; any derivative use of this site or its
contents; any downloading or copying of account
information for the benefit of another merchant; or any use
of data mining, robots, or similar data gathering and
extraction tools .. .You may not frame or utilize framing
techniques ... You may not use any meta tags or any other
"hidden text" utilizing Amazon.com's name . . . Any
unauthorized use terminates the permission or license
granted by Amazon.com."o
There are five apparent purposes for restrictions on use clauses:
(1) to expressly delineate the ways in which web site content
can be used;
(2) to prevent the creation of an implied license;
(3) to avoid application of the first-sale doctrine;
(4) to expand the scope of existing intellectual property rights;
and
(5) to prevent certain activities considered to be invasive or
destructive.
The first three purposes are an outgrowth of intellectual property
law; namely, the right of WSOs to control certain uses of their intellectual
property rights."' In this regard, restrictions on use clauses are similar to
software licenses in that they are often worded as express grants of power to
use a web site. Such clauses have both positive and negative aspects. On the
one hand, web site users are given permission to use a web site in a specified
'09 Sometimes the scope of use and restrictions on use clauses are stated as
separate clauses. Other times they are combined into one clause. Still other times language
concerning the authorized use and limitations on use of a web site are dispersed throughout a
TOU.
110 Amazon, Conditions of Use, supra note 5.
11 For instance, the owner of a copyrighted work has the right to decide how such
works will be sold and distributed, whether and to what extent they can be copied, and if they
can be publicly displayed or used to make a derivative work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). Under
patent law, the owner of a patented invention has the right to control the making, using,
offering for sale, and selling of such invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
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manner. On the other hand, by granting an express license, WSOs hope to
prevent the creation of an implied license."
2
Although a simple intellectual property notice should suffice to
inform web site users of the limitations on the use of intellectual property
rights that are imposed by operation of law,1 3 many WSOs fear that by
creating a web site and making information accessible for free on the
Internet, web site users will assume that the information contained therein
can be used more broadly than the law allows. While the copying of web site
content for small-scale personal use is likely to be inferred, WSOs do not
want anyone to believe that large-scale commercial use is permissible." 4 A
112 3 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 10.10[C] ("It will sometimes be held that in order
to permit the full enjoyment of a right expressly granted there is a necessary implication that
certain collateral rights have also been granted."). "Generally, the existence and scope of an
implied license depend upon the facts of the individual case, and are determined from the
objective conduct of the parties." Allen R. Grogan, Implied Licensing Issues in The Online
World, 14 No. 8 COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1997, at 1.
113 See supra Section Ill.A.ii. Consider the nature of most web sites. If one thinks
of a web site as a compilation of information consisting mainly of information and advertising
(which most web sites are), a web site is not much different from a magazine. Open the pages
of your favorite magazine, and although you are likely to find a copyright notice and perhaps a
trademark notice, you will not find a scope of use provision. This is because a scope of use
provision is not needed to protect the magazine's contents. To the extent the contents of the
magazine are protected by copyright law, copyright law prevents it from being copied,
distributed, displayed, and used to create derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106. And no
agreement is needed to invoke the provisions of the U.S. copyright laws. Note, however, that
newspaper and magazine publishers often include scope of use provisions on their web sites.
See Matthew D. Walden, Note, Could Fair Use Equal Breach of Contract?: An Analysis of
Informational Web Site User Agreements and Their Restrictive Copyright Provisions, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1625, 1628 (2001). This practice raises the issue: Are TOUs necessary
in cyberspace when they are not used in the physical world? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact
that there would be a tremendous public outcry if all information and products that are sold
were made subject to an agreement that restricts how they can be used.
114 Because of the nature of computers, there is at least an implied license that web
site users can make a copy of web site content for purposes of momentarily storing it in the
random access memory (RAM) of their computers and viewing it on their computer monitors.
Grogan, supra note 112, at 2-3. Given how web site usage has developed, it may also be
argued that web site users have an implied license to make hard-copies of web pages for
reference and archival purposes (e.g., web site users should be allowed to make archival
copies of the TOUs that supposedly govern their activities). Also, based upon the reasoning of
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), Recording
Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th
Cir. 1999), and Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), web
site users arguably have the right to copy web pages for time-shifting, space-shifting and
reverse engineering purposes.
Assuming that all of the foregoing uses are acceptable to a WSO, a scope of
use/restrictions on use clause that is intended to prevent the creation of other types of implied
licenses is only meaningful if such licenses are likely to be recognized. Moreover, as argued
by David Kramer in a discussion on spidering, some implied licenses can be revoked. See
David Kramer & Jay Monahan, Panel Discussion to Bot or Not to Bot: The Implications of
Spidering, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 241, 253 (2000) ("But an implied license can be
expressly revoked. So, if I tell you, 'You may not copy this page,' which is what all these bots
are doing, if I expressly revoke the license to do that, then when you make that copy, you're
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strategy for reducing the risk that an implied license will be inferred is to set
forth the boundaries of use in an express license. 15 Of course, whether such
provisions are an essential part of a TOU depends upon the facts and
circumstances surrounding a particular site and whether a license is likely to
be inferred in the first instance.
Another apparent purpose of restrictions on use clauses relates to the
first-sale and exhaustion doctrines. Pursuant to the first-sale doctrine, once
the owner of a copyrighted work sells copies of the work, purchasers have
the right to sell or otherwise dispose of their copies without permission of the
copyright owner."6 Under patent law, although the owner of a patented
invention has the initial right to control whether and how the invention is
made, used, offered for sale, or sold," 7 the exhaustion doctrine recognizes
that once a patented article is sold without restriction the buyer can use it and
resell it." 8 Thus, like its forbearer the software license, restrictions on use
clauses are often worded in language of a license in the hope of preventing
the first-sale and exhaustion doctrines from applying. However, this purpose
seems misplaced as applied to the mere operation of a web site since nothing
akin to a book, software or a patented article is actually being sold.
Like definitions of rights clauses, restrictions on use provisions are
also often designed to contractually expand existing intellectual property
rights." 9 This is done, not by defining the scope of what a WSO asserts is
protected by intellectual property law, but by attempting to limit the
otherwise legitimate uses that a web site user can make of web site content.
For instance, a TOU might state that the site cannot be the subject of "reverse
engineering' 20 or that web site users waive their rights to use web site
committing a copyright infringement - perhaps."). Under this view, even without a TOU that
contains a scope of use clause, if a WSO becomes aware of activities by a web site user that it
dislikes, it can always forward a message that states: "We hereby revoke whatever implied
licenses to use our site that may have arisen in the past." To the extent implied licenses can be
revoked, an implied license may be better than an express license because a WSO may not be
able to unilaterally revoke an express license that is contained in a "binding" TOU.
115 Michael J. Swope, Comment, Recent Developments in Patent Law: Implied
License - An Emerging Threat to Contributory Infringement Protection, 68 TEMPLE L. REV.
281, 305 (1995) ("The best method to control the scope of the implied license is proactive
(that is, before the product is sold). Before the sale, the patent owner has two primary forms of
recourse: (1) providing a notice to the purchaser along with the product; and (2) controlling
the scope of the implied license when the patent application is filed.").
116 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
17 35 U.S.C.§ 271 (2000).
118 5 CnsuM, supra note 46, § 16.01 ("One who purchases a patented product
from one with authority to sell it for use in the United States may use and resell that product
free of the control of the patent owner."). For a more extensive discussion of the law
governing implied patent licenses, see Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair,
Reconstruction and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MARYLAND L. REv.
423 (1999). See also Swope, supra note 115.
"19 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
120 The term "reverse engineering" refers to a process by which an item,
procedure, or work of authorship that is publicly available is studied and, perhaps, physically
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content for the "fair use" purposes specified in U.S. copyright law.'2 ' Or, as
discussed supra, they may limit the use of "trade secrets" where no actual
trade secrets exist.
122
Efforts to restrict the use of web site content in ways that are allowed
under established intellectual property laws are arguably against public
policy because they disrupt the delicate balance that such laws seek to
achieve between free competition and restrictions on competition. 23 Thus,
while it is tempting for WSOs to include reverse engineering, fair use and
similar restrictions in TOUs, the enforceability of those provisions is
questionable. 24 Additionally, because such provisions constitute restrictions
on trade that go beyond the scope of recognized intellectual property rights,
disassembled to determine how it was made. See NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY, supra
note 23.
"'1 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000) (setting forth the factors to be evaluated to determine
whether a Paricular use of information constitutes "fair use").
See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
3 See Campbell aka Luke Sywalker v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
577 (1994) (quoting Steward v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)) ("The fair use doctrine thus
'permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."'). Relying on the fair use
doctrine in finding'that it is not a violation of copyright law to copy the software of another
for purposes of reverse engineering, the court in Sega Enterprises emphasized that one of the
purposes of copyright law is to encourage the free flow of information and creativity. 977 F.2d
at 1523 ("It is precisely this growth in creative expression, based on the dissemination of other
creative works and unprotected ideas contained in those works, that the Copyright Act was
intended to promote."). See also Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797
F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[The purpose of copyright law is to create the most efficient
and productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to
promote learning, culture and development.").
While the Uniform Trade-Secrets Act (UTSA) prohibits the "misappropriation" of
trade secrets, it acknowledges that "proper" means of acquisition include "[d]iscovery by
'reverse engineering', that is, by starting with the known product and working backward to
find the method by which it was developed." UNF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I (amended 1985),
14 U.L.A. 437 (1990). In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court identified
this right of reverse engineering as a key reason for its finding that trade secret laws are not
preempted by U.S. patent law. 416 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1974) ("Trade secret law provides far
weaker protection in many respects than patent law. While trade secret law does not forbid the
discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse
engineering, patent law operates 'against the world' .... ").
& See generally Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne, Scotchmer, The Law and
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002); Walden, supra note 113; John
E. Mauk, Note, The Slippery Slope of Secrecy. Why Patent Law Preempts Reverse-
Engineering Clauses in Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 819 (2001);
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright
Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DuKE L.J. 479 (1995); Nimmer, Brown &
Frischling, supra note 84; Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of
Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93 (1997); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the
Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs,
68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1091 (1995). But see Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1334,
1342-44 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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they may subject WSOs to liability for unfair competition."' At the very
least, the anti-competitive and restrictive nature of the provisions may make
such provisions unenforceable particularly if the web site user was not
required to affirmatively assent to the TOU in which they are contained.1
26
The fourth apparent purpose of restrictions on use clauses relates to
the boundary-less nature of the Internet. Unlike ACME, which has physical
control of the real property on which its store is located, a WSO who
establishes a web site on the open architecture of the Internet has fewer
traditional means by which to control unwanted activity.' 7 To be sure,
technological means exist to enable a WSO to limit access to its site, but
most WSOs prefer to have an initial open-door policy and deal with
problems later.' By including detailed language in a TOU that places
restrictions on how a web site can be used, WSOs attempt to draw
contractual boundaries around what many consider to be their property. Such
provisions are conceptually akin to signs on real property that read: "No
Trespassing" or "No Shoes, No Shirt, No Service.' 2 9
125 See supra note 107.
126 See discussion of enforceability of TOUs, infra Section IV.
127 For instance, a WSO cannot call the police to have a trespasser removed from
the premises. Arguably, however, WSOs have more ways to control the use of their site
through "self-help." For instance, WSOs can condition use of their online services to web site
users who "subscribe" and program their servers to block access to offending users.
128 For a discussion of a variety of technological means that can be used to prevent
web sites from being accessed by robots, see Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, Spiders and Crawlers and
Bots, Oh My: The Economic Efficiency and Public Policy of Online Contracts That Restrict
Data Collection, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3 (2002) [hereinafter "Spiders and Crawlers and
Bots"], and Panel Discussion to Bot or Not to Bot: The Implications of Spidering, supra note
114. Of particular interest to WSOs that are concerned about the enforceability of TOUs is the
ability to use software to identify robots after they begin operation and require them to execute
a "click-wrap" agreement before continuing. As noted by Mr. Rosenfeld, this tactic raises the
issue of whether robots can enter into binding contracts (i.e., are they the authorized agents of
their masters?) Spiders and Crawlers and Bots, supra, at 41.
The use of technological means to control access to a web site before a visit begins
is less controversial than so-called "self-help" measures that are engaged in after access is
initially allowed. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help,
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998) (discussing the self-help provision of early drafts of
UCITA, then known as Article 2B of the U.C.C.). See also UCITA § 816, which prohibits
electronic self-help as a remedy for breach of contract. UCITA § 816 (2002) ("In this section,
'electronic self-help' means the electronic exercise without court order of a licensor's rights in
the event of cancellation of a license because of the licensee's breach of contract, but does not
include actions expressly permitted under Section 814 and 815(b)."). UCITA § 814 states:
"On material breach of an access contract or if the agreement so provides, a party may
discontinue all contractual rights of access of the party in breach and direct any person that is
assisting the performance of the contract to discontinue its performance." UCITA § 814
(2002).
129 Jay Monahan, Senior Intellectual Property Counsel for eBay, referred to
restrictive use provisions in TOUs, but acknowledged the likely unenforceability of browse-
wrap TOUs, when he stated:
Now, we may not ever be able to bind somebody into a contract, but I
would say that, at a minimum, that constitutes a very detailed "no
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The restrictions on use provisions contained in many TOUs,
however, often go beyond merely stating a right to control the use of the web
site to detail a litany of behavior that is expressly forbidden. Reference in the
AOL TOU set forth above to "data mining," "robots," "framing," and "meta-
tags" is one example. The TOUs of Yahoo and Excite include a long list of
"don'ts" that fill a standard 8 " x 11" sheet of paper. 30 Of particular
relevance to the present discussion are restrictions on use that seek to prevent
invasive or disruptive activities. These activities generally fall into one of
five categories: (1) intentionally spreading computer viruses, t31  (2)
"hacking,"' 132 (3) "linking,' ' 33 (4) "sparnming,"'
134 and (5) "data mining."' 35
Trespassing" about what is allowed and what is not allowed. And one of
the things that's in there is a specific statement that robotic access copying
is not allowed. Spamming is not allowed.
Panel Discussion to Bot or Not to Bot: The Implications of Spidering, supra note 114, at 247-
48,257.
See also in ra Section IV.
130 Yahoo, Terms of Service, Member Conduct, 6, at
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/tenms/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
S131 Often referred to by various other names, such as: "Trojan horses," "worms,"
"time bombs," "cancel bots," or "easter eggs."
132 Also referred to as "cracking." The term "hacking" means "[t]he act of gaining
unauthorized access to another network, computer system or files" while "cracking" refers to
"the act of breaking password protection on a network, computer system, or files." Keith J.
Epstein & Bill Tancer, Enforcement of Use Limitations by Internet Services Providers: "How
to Stop That Hacker, Cracker, Spammer, Spoofer, Flamer, Bomber", 19 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENTr. L.J. 661, 669 (1997).
133 Also includes the related acts of "framing" and "metatagging." See Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REv. 609,
631-33 (1998).
The most basic type of link.., is the Hypertext Reference Link (HREF).
A HREF link is usually a bit of text within a web document that is
highlighted or otherwise set off from the rest of the text. When a user
clicks on the HREF link (or pointer), the computer stops displaying what
is currently on-screen, connects to the linked site, and displays the content
of that site . . . . A second type of link ... is the "frame." . . . A site that
utilizes framing has the ability to bring up the entire contents or portions
of one or more of the other sites that are "framed" within the linking site.
Id. A "meta tag" is an optional HTML tag that is used to specify information about a web
document to search engines crawling the Internet. NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY, supra
note 23.
134 Also includes the related acts of "mail bombing," "flaming," and "syn/flood
attacks." "Spamming" and "mail bombing" refer to the act of sending numerous unsolicited e-
mail or newsgroup messages. Epstein and Tancer define "spamming" as: "[T]o cause a news
group to be flooded with irrelevant or inappropriate messages." Epstein & Tancer, supra note
132, at 668. "Mail bombing" is defined as: "[T1o send, or urge others to send, massive
amounts of e-mail to a single system or person, with intent to crash the recipient's system." Id.
"Flaming" means: "[T]he act of emailing or posting material designed to insult or provoke."
Id. at 670. "The sole purpose of a syn flood is to overburden the intended victim's systems by
sending a high volume of spurious data, effectively slowing or shutting down those systems."
Id. at 669.
135 "Data mining" generally refers to a process of collecting and analyzing data in
order to better target advertising and other promotional efforts. NEWTON'S TELECOM
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In addition to whatever technological capabilities a WSO has to stop
the foregoing acts, it is hoped that express restrictions in TOUs will provide
the basis for a breach of contract action. More importantly, by designating
certain activities as "unauthorized," WSOs arguably enhance the legal
protections they enjoy under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 36
and make it easier to define such activities as actionable torts.
137
Even in the absence of a TOU, the first two categories of proscribed
activities are clearly outlawed by the CFAA. 38 According to 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(2), it is unlawful for anyone to intentionally access a computer (i.e.,
hack or crack) without authorization to obtain information that is: (A)
contained in a financial record of a financial institution; (B) from any
department or agency of the United States; or (c) from any "protected
DICTIONARY, supra note 23. To the extent such activities are focused on the review, collection
and organization of publicly available information that is not protected by copyright, trade
secret or privacy laws, there does not appear to be anything wrong with this practice. See
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. 99-CV76541, 2000 WL 1887522, at * 3 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
("[U]nfair as it may seem to [Ticketmaster], the basic facts that it gathers and publishes cannot
be protected from copying."). But see Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the
Legal Protection of Databases, art. 7, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (requiring members of the European
Union to enact laws to protect databases which constitute "qualitatively and/or quantitatively a
substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents.").
With the development of software robots has come the ability of companies to
collect, organize and store information faster than is humanly possible. This raises the
question of whether, separate and apart from the principles articulated in Feist, the use of such
robots should be allowed. Jeffrey Rosenfeld explains:
Especially troublesome to those who struggle against this unwanted
copying of website information are software robots. Also referred to as
"bots," "spiders," and "web crawlers," these small programs automatically
and rapidly search, copy, and retrieve information from websites.
Prevalent and controversial among software robots are shopbots or
pricebots, which comb through commercial websites, extracting pricing
and product information. Typically shopbots are used in conjunction with
a metasite, a web site that displays prices from a variety of vendors for an
identical item.
Spiders and Crawlers and Bots, supra note 128, at 3.
136 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
137 Common law and statutory causes of action that have been brought, with mixed
success, to preclude this type of activity include: false designation of origin under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(a) (2000); dilution of trademarks under the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c); trespass to chattel, conversion, and unjust enrichment. See eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health
Care Discount, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Cal. App. 2001), review
granted, 43 P.3d 587; Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 1030. See also various state statutes like California Penal Code
§502(c) (2003). See also Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986)
(making it illegal for anyone to intercept any wire, oral or electronic communication,
including stored communications).
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computer" if the conduct involved interstate or foreign communication. 139
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) makes it unlawful for anyone
without authorization to knowingly cause "the transmission of a program,
information, code, or command" (i.e., a virus), and as a result, intentionally
cause damage to a protected computer. While a contract provision that
specifically prohibits the foregoing acts will make it clear that such acts are
not authorized by the WSO, it is highly unlikely that authorization will be
found without an express agreement to that effect.
The acts of "linking, .... framing" and "metatagging" are not
specifically precluded by the CFAA. They also are not necessarily unwanted
or disruptive. 40 WSOs generally benefit from links to their sites because
they increase web site traffic and, possibly, advertising revenue.' 4 1 However,
if linking, framing and metatagging mislead or confuse consumers, efforts to
stop such activities may be required. These efforts are likely to focus on
principles of unfair competition, including trademark infringement and
trademark dilution, and copyright infringement. 42 Given that such claims are
a product of statute or common law, a potential breach of contract claim
based on restrictions on linking, framing and metatagging does not add much
to a WSO's litigation arsenal. In fact, because of the principle of law that
injunctive relief, particularly preliminary relief, is not available to prevent a
breach of contract, a breach of contract action is unlikely to give a WSO the
timely relief it needs to prevent misleading linking. 143
Efforts to stop "spamming" and "data mining" activities have
focused on both the CFAA and the common law tort of trespass to chattels.
139 A "protected computer" is defined broadly to include any computer "which is
used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
140 "Without hyperlinks, the World Wide Web would not have the qualities that
make it so compelling .... Without these links, and without search engines that are based on
the techniques of hyperlinking, the information posted on the web would lose much of its
value as it would not be easy to find." Alain Strowel & Nicolas Ide, Liability with Regard to
Hyperlinks, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 403 (2001).
141 The pricing structure of advertising on the Internet is often based upon the
volume of visitors to a site.
142 See generally Strowel & Ide, supra note 140 (describing potential causes of
action for linking and framing); Robert L. Tucker, Information Superhighway Robbery. The
Tortious Misuse of Links, Metatags, and Domain Names, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8 (1999)
(exploring potential tort liability for linking and metatagging); Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A.
Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-Tags: An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243
(1998) (discussing the intellectual property law implications of some of the basic features of
the Internet); see also generally Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No 97-3055 DDP
(C.D. Cal., complaint filed Apr. 28, 1997) (alleging trademark infringement); Washington
Post v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Cir. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y., complaint filed Feb. 28, 1997)
(alleging copyright and trademark claims).
14 See, e.g., Tickets.Coin, 2000 WL 1887522, at * 5 ("The contract theory lacks
sufficient proof of agreement by defendant to be taken seriously as a ground for preliminary
injunction. Besides, a preliminary injunction to prevent a breach of contract is an almost
unheard of thing, being the equivalent of specific enforcement by preliminary injunction.").
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A claim under the CFAA is based on the assertion that the alleged activity is
"unauthorized" by the WSO and therefore constitutes illegal accessing of a
protected computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). Under the CFAA,
"[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of [18
U.S.C. § 1030] may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain
compensatory damages and injunctive relief . . . ," provided the alleged
damages meet a $5,000 threshold.'" While the CFAA does not require
contractual restrictions on use as a prerequisite to suit, the existence of a
binding and enforceable agreement may be cited to show that certain activity
is unauthorized. For instance, in America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., AOL
complained that the defendant sent large numbers of unauthorized and
unsolicited bulk e-mail advertisements (known as "spam") to AOL
members. 45 Because the defendant admitted to maintaining a membership in
AOL and was therefore subject to AOL's Terms of Service agreement, the
court found that the defendant's actions were unauthorized within the
meaning of the CFAA.
146
Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a trespass to chattel
occurs when one person intentionally uses or intermeddles with a chattel in
the possession of another. 147 In CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,
CompuServe sought to prevent the defendant from sending unsolicited e-
mail to its subscribers and based its action on the tort of trespass to chattels.
148 The focus of the case was not on the act of sending unsolicited e-mail per
se, but on the alleged burden that massive e-mails placed on CompuServe's
computer system.1 49 Because CompuServe notified defendant that it no
longer consented to the use of its proprietary computer equipment, the court
had little trouble finding a trespass.5
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(5)(B), (e)(8), (g). ("[Tihe term 'damage' means any
impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information" that -
(A) causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during a one-year period to one or more
individuals; (B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs, the medical
examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more individuals; (C) causes physical
injury to any person; or (D) threatens public health or safety.).
14' 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998).
146 Id. at 450 ("Defendants have stated that they acquired these e-mail addresses
by using extractor software programs. Defendants' actions violated AOL's Terms of Service,
and as such was [sic] unauthorized.").
147 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b) (1965).
148 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1997). See also eBay v. Bidder's Edge,
Inc., No. C-99-21200 RMW, 2000 WL 1863564 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.corn, 126 F. Supp.
2d 238.
149 CompuServe Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1022, 1027 ("Plaintiff has demonstrated that
defendants' intrusions into their computer systems harm plaintiff's business reputation and
goodwill.").
"o id. at 1024 ("It is arguable that CompuServe's policy statement, insofar as it
may serve as a limitation upon the scope of its consent to the use of its computer equipment,
may be insufficiently communicated to potential third-party users when it is merely posted at
some location on the network. However, in the present case the record indicates that
defendants were actually notified that they were using CompuServe's equipment in an
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As with definitions of rights clauses, the question whether
restrictions on use clauses are needed in TOUs depends on whether they are
likely to accomplish anything. If merely being granted access to a web site is
unlikely to result in a broad implied license, a use clause is not needed to
prevent such implication. Similarly, if the nature of the web site content is
such that there is little risk that it will be copied or reverse engineered, a use
clause is not needed to contractually limit such uses. Also, to the extent data
mining activities are limited to search engine type functions and do not
substantially impair the operation of a WSO's servers, they are desirable
because they enable a WSO's site to be found. On the other hand, where a
web site is rich in content that may be copied by others and technological
means are ineffective to limit such activity, then even a seemingly
unenforceable browse-wrap agreement may have value as a prophylactic
measure.151
3. Third-Party Content Provisions
As used in this article, "third-party content provisions" refer to those
portions of a TOU that are addressed to information or content sent to a
WSO by a web site user. Thus, the following discussion assumes some level
of interactivity between the WSO and the web site user whether in the form
of e-mail, chat rooms, bulletin boards, or a process for ordering goods and
services. One easy way to avoid the problems that arise from third-party
content is to configure a web site so it does not allow for the receipt or
posting of such content. If a web site only allows e-mail, 'but the e-mails are
not accessible to the general public, the establishment of internal procedures
for the handling of such correspondence should suffice to limit a WSO's
exposure.' It is where third-party content can be posted on a web site that
most issues arise.
The primary concern that WSOs attempt to address in third-party
content clauses relates to potential liability for copyright infringement,
defamation and false statements. An example of such a clause is contained in
the TOU of Amazon, which states, in pertinent part:
unacceptable manner."). In other words, while the court questioned the enforceability of
CompuServe's TOU, it felt that it at least acted as a no trespassing sign.
'51 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
152 This point demonstrates the nonsensical nature of many TOU provisions.
Obviously, businesses have been dealing with customer correspondence and personal
information for years, indeed centuries. Yet, the practice of entering into a contractual
agreement with customers to define how collected information will be used is largely unheard
of in the physical world. If correspondence that a business receives is defamatory, the law
establishes that a business can be held liable for "re-publishing" its contents. Similarly, if a
business becomes known for distributing the personal information of its clients to others, it
will not be long before its revenues will suffer as a result.
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Visitors may post reviews, comments, and other content...
so long as the content is not illegal, obscene, threatening,
defamatory, invasive of privacy, infringing of intellectual
property rights, or otherwise injurious to third parties or
objectionable and does not consist of or contain software
viruses, political campaigning, commercial solicitation,
chain letters, mass mailings, or any form of "spam.....
• . . You represent and warrant that you own or otherwise
control all of the rights to the content that you post; that the
content is accurate; that use of the content you supply does
not violate this policy and will not cause injury to any person
or entity; and that you will indemnify Amazon.com or its
affiliates for all claims resulting from content you supply.
Amazon.com has the right but not the obligation to monitor
and edit or remove any activity or content. Amazon.com
takes no responsibility and assumes no liability for any
content posted by you or any third party.
53
As discussed above, a WSO's desire to limit its liability for content
posted by others is understandable. Simply because a WSO provides a forum
for others to speak doesn't mean that it should be responsible for such
speech. However, TOU provisions that seek to limit a WSO's responsibility
for the defamatory, false or infringing content posted by others are arguably
inessential because principles of law already exist which define the narrow
circumstances under which a WSO can be held liable for the acts of others.
Moreover, a provision of a TOU that characterizes a WSO as a "mere
conduit" of information is meaningless if the WSO acts in a way that makes
it directly or vicariously responsible for the alleged wrongs.
In order to determine whether one party will be held liable for the
defamatory statements or infringing content of another it is necessary to
examine the role, if any, that the first party actually played in the
dissemination of the statements. Under well-established principles of
defamation law, a person who is a conduit of information and who exercises
no editorial control over the information cannot be liable for defamation.1
4
However, where some editorial control is exerted, different liability rules
153 Amazon, Conditions of Use, supra note 5. The eBay TOU includes a
long list of so-called "restricted activities." It reads, in part:
Your information (or any items listed) and your activities on the site shall
not: (a) be false, inaccurate or misleading; (b) be fraudulent or involve the
sale of counterfeit or stolen items; (c) infringe any [third party rights] ...
(d) violate any law... ; (e) be defamatory. . . ; (f) be obscene.
eBay, User Agreement, supra note 6, 6.1.
154 See Douglas B. Luftman, Defamation Liability for On-Line Services. The Sky
Is Not Falling, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1071, 1083-87 (1997) (summarizing the "functional
analysis" of defamation law).
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apply depending upon whether the person is characterized as a "publisher" or
a "distributor." Under the laws governing contributory copyright
infingement, a person can be held responsible for the infringing activity of
another if he "induces, causes or materially contributes to the conduct of
another" with knowledge of the infringing activity. 156 Under principles of
agency law, a person can be held responsible for the acts of his agents and
employees committed in the course of their agency or employment.
Much of the concern about a WSO's potential liability for third-party
content, and therefore the need of WSOs to address such issues in a TOU,
has been ameliorated by the enactment of both the Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act, discussed supra,158 and the
Communications Decency Act (CDA).' 59 There are two parts to the CDA
that are of particular importance to WSOs. First, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)
significantly reduces the risks of "publisher" liability when it states: "No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider."' 6 Second, the so-called "good samaritan" provision
reduces the risks of "distributor" liability by specifying a level of control that
an interactive computer service can assert over third-party content without
incurring liability for such content. 16'
Another aspect of third-party content clauses that appears in some
TOUs concerns the question of who owns the rights to information that is not
authored or generated by the WSO but is created by web site users. The
subject information can take the form of demographic, personal and
statistical information about web site users or may consist of actual messages
155 Id.
'5 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1373 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
15" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 212, 219 (1958). See also Sarah
Beckett Boehm, A Brave New World of Free Speech: Should Interactive Computer Service
Providers Be Held Liable for the Material They Disseminate?, 5 RICH. J.L. & TECH 7, 44-48
(1998) (noting that even though the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1),
may act to prevent computer service providers from being held directly liable for defamatory
content posted by web site users, they can still be held vicariously liable under principles of
agency law, See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
"9 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2002).
16 Id. An "interactive computer service" is defined to mean "any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Intemet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Arguably, this definition is broad enough to encompass
WSOs that ?rovide a degree of interactivity on their sites.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) ("No provider.., shall be held liable on account of...
any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable ....").
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or content written by a web site user. 162 Paradoxically, although WSOs are
quick to disclaim responsibility for defamatory and infringing content that is
posted on their site by others, they often claim the right to use such
information at their discretion and sometimes claim an ownership interest in
such information. In this regard, Amazon' s TOU states:
If you do post content or submit material, and unless we
indicate otherwise, you grant Amazon.com and its affiliates
a nonexclusive, royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable, and
fully sublicensable right to use, reproduce, modify, adapt,
publish, translate, create derivative works from, distribute,
and display such content throughout the world in any media.
You grant Amazon.com and its affiliates and sublicensees
the right to use the name that you submit in connection with
such content, if they choose.1
63
To the extent a WSO asserts ownership over content posted by
others and then re-publishes it on its web site, it can be held accountable for
any harm caused thereby. In this way, the ownership aspects of third-party
content provisions are contrary to TOU provisions that seek to distance
WSOs from liability for third-party content and may act to limit the
effectiveness of those provisions. But the underlying rationale of third-party
content clauses apparently relates, not to a preconceived plan by WSOs to
use and profit from such content, but to a fear that its inadvertent use will
expose WSOs to liability. By including a license to use third-party content in
a TOU, a WSO can theoretically protect itself from copyright, right of
publicity and idea submission claims brought by the users of its interactive
services.'6 It may also help WSOs avoid claims that they violated the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).
165
162 "Electronic transactions, especially when based on on-going relationships,
transfer electronically substantial amounts of potentially significant information that relates to
both parties to the relationship. How that information is handled and who controls rights of
use and disclosure in the information represents an issue important to the overall relationship."
Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Legal Issues, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 211,237 (1996).
163 Amazon, Conditions of Use, supra note 5. Some TOUs have specific idea
submission provisions. For example, see Microsoft, Information on Terms of Use, supra note
6, paragraph labeled "Unsolicited Idea Submission Policy."
'6 The risk of copyright infringement claims arises from the. fact that, as a general
rule, the creator of a work of authorship is the owner of the copyrights contained therein, and
thus, web site users own whatever copyrightable content is contained in their original
postings. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). A right of publicity claim may arise if the name or likeness
of a web site user is used without permission by a WSO in advertising or other promotional
efforts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652C (1977) ("One who appropriates to his own
use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy."); see also CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3344-3344.1 (2003). Under idea submission law, a
duty to compensate an "idea man" will arise under circumstances where an express or implied
promise of compensation exists. Although it is difficult to create such a duty, many companies
have been subject to lawsuits regarding the receipt and alleged use of unsolicited ideas. See
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While third-party content clauses provide WSOs with an argument to
defeat the foregoing claims, they will not necessarily prevent all such claims.
For instance, a TOU provision will do no good if ideas are being submitted
under circumstances where a promise of compensation can still be inferred.
Additionally, if information was provided to a WSO in confidence or under
other circumstances where the web site user did not intend it to be seen by
the public, the third-party content provision may not apply. Finally, where a
WSO is under a statutory duty to maintain the confidentiality of certain
information, or it has promised to do so in a posted privacy policy, a WSO
should expect its use of any third-party content to be scrutinized by
consumer interest groups and government regulators.
66
4. Warranty Disclaimers
The next three common provisions of TOUs - warranty disclaimers,
damage limitation clauses and dispute resolution provisions - are frequent
features of many contracts. A warranty clause can serve three separate
functions: (1) to set forth express "limited" warranties; (2) to disclaim
express warranties that may be inferred from advertising or promotional
efforts; and (3) to disclaim specified implied warranties. In TOUs, warranty
provisions typically consist of disclaimers of all express and implied
warranties. The following warranty clause from the Walt Disney Internet
Group (WDIG) TOU is an example:
THE MATERIALS IN THIS WDIG SITE ARE
PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT WARRANTIES OF
ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. TO THE
FULLEST EXTENT PERMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO
APPLICABLE LAW, WE DISCLAIM ALL
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING,
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
generally, Stephen M. Westbrook & Carol L. Smith, Ownership of Ideas, in TRADE SECRETS
PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA chs. 2-3 (Continuing Education of the Bar (CEB), 2d ed. 1996-
2002); Stephen M. Westbrook & Jack Russo, Idea Submissions, in TRADE SECRETS PRACTICE
IN CALIFORNIA chs. 2-3 (Continuing Education of the Bar (CEB), 2d ed. 1996-2002).
165 The Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986 prohibits any
person operating an electronic communications service from knowingly
divulging the content of communications in that service while in
electronic storage to another unless the service provider is authorized by
the service agreement to access the content of the messages for a purpose
other than storage or processing in the ordinary course of the storage and
communications service. What constitutes authorization in a service
agreement has not been tested in court and, consequently, the better
approach is to be explicit in the services agreement about for what
purpose, if any, the service provider has access to the information.
Nimmer, Electronic Contracting, supra note 162, at 238.
166 See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
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PARTICULAR PURPOSE. WE DO NOT WARRANT
THAT THE FUNCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE
MATERIALS ON ANY WDIG SITE WILL BE
UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR-FREE, THAT DEFECTS
WILL BE CORRECTED, OR THAT ANY WDIG SITE OR
THE SERVERS THAT MAKE SUCH MATERIALS
AVAILABLE ARE FREE OF VIRUSES OR OTHER
HARMFUL COMPONENTS. WE DO NOT WARRANT
OR MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING
THE USE OR THE RESULTS OF THE USE OF THE
MATERIALS ON ANY WDIG SITE IN TERMS OF
THEIR CORRECTNESS, ACCURACY, RELIABILITY,
OR OTHERWISE. 67
The breadth of the foregoing provision reveals the uncertainties that
are at the heart of warranty clauses in TOUs. Because web sites are a new
phenomenon, it is not yet clear which, if any, implied warranties will apply
to their operation. Rather than speculate about the warranty obligations that
may arise, many WSOs choose to broadly disclaim all actual and potential
warranties. However, the reference in the foregoing clause to "applicable
law" also reveals the potential risk of relying too heavily on warranty
disclaimers because even the most broadly worded disclaimers will not
insulate a WSO from all applicable obligations. 68 Thus, while the strategy of
disclaiming warranties is usually advised in situations where such obligations
are unclear, it would be a mistake for a WSO to assume that it need not
exercise a minimal level of due care in the operation of its web site.
169
167 Disney Online, Terms of Use, supra note 5.
'68 For reasons of public policy and pursuant to some statutes, certain obligations
cannot be avoided or disclaimed. See the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 195(1),
which provides that: "A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused
intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy." RESTATEMENT
(SEc OND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (1981). Also, while it may be possible to avoid liability for
mere negligence, individuals and companies usually cannot disclaim responsibility for gross
negligence or intentional torts. See the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which provides:
A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if
(a) the term exempts an employer from liability to an employee for
injury in the course of his employment;
(b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from
liability to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for
breach of that duty, or
(c) the other party is similarly a member of a class protected against the
class to which the first party belongs.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2) (1981).
169 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "[O]ne who undertakes to render
services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge
normally possessed by members of that profession or trade .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A (1965).
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Moreover, WSOs should consider the adverse impact that broad disclaimers
of warranties may have on consumer goodwill and how difficult it would be
to meet various warranty obligations.170 It may be that by refusing to
disclaim certain warranties and expressly providing others, a WSO can set its
web site apart from competitors.
171
Of course, in order to determine which warranties to disclaim and
which warranties to honor, WSOs need some sense of the nature of the
warranties that may apply to the operation of a web site. For software
licenses, the courts usually apply the warranties that are specified in Article 2
of the U.C.C. However, the operation of a web site does not involve a sale of
goods. 172 Thus, while the U.C.C. may be looked to for guidance as to the
type of warranties that should apply to web sites, whatever warranties are
ultimately held applicable are more likely to be derived from common law.
In the two states where the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA) has been enacted, a number of implied warranties are recognized
by statute. These warranties are instructive of the nature of warranty
obligations that may be applied to web sites in the future.
The first two warranties listed in UCITA are the implied warranties
of noninfringement' 73 and noninterference. 74 These warranties are neither
170 See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability
In Software Contracts: A Warranty No One Dares To Give and How To Change That, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 393 (1997) (discussing the practice of the software
industry to disclaim all implied warranties and suggesting how the scope of the implied
warranty of merchantability might be altered to decrease the number of disclaimers). "Though
the disclaimer is routine, software publishers have little interest in needlessly eroding
confidence in the quality of their products by conspicuously disclaiming a warranty with
which their products may well comply." Id. at 393.
171 See the web site of Land's End where, instead of disclaiming all warranties, Land's End
has chosen to give an unconditional money-back guarantee. Land's End, Guaranteed.Period.,
at
http://www.landsend.com/d/fp/help/0,, 1_36877_3688337024__,00.htmlsid=6432023318
867160040 (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
172 A much different body of law applies if the transaction entails a
license, sale or other provision of information, images, or data. Here, sales
of goods law does not apply, nor does any idea of there being implied
merchantability or other warranties. Instead, we are in the realm of
contract common law and, more importantly, we are governed by cases
that entail consideration of free speech and similar, noncommercial
limitations on what liability or obligation should be imposed in a contract
when the parties did not agree explicitly to anything defining what they
expected the obligation to be.
Nimmer, Electronic Contracting, supra note 162, at 232-33. See also the proposed changes to
U.C.C. section 2-103(k), which expressly excludes "information" from the definition of
"goods." American Law Institute, Council Draft No. 2, at 8 (Oct. 8, 2002).
173 Pursuant to the warranty of noninfringement, a licensor of information
represents that "the information will be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third party
by way of infringement or misappropriation." See UCITA § 401(a) (2002).
174 Under the warranty of noninterference and exclusivity a licensor warrants "that
no person holds a rightful claim to, or interest in, the information which... will interfere with
the licensee's enjoyment" of the information. See UCITA § 401(b).
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unique to the Internet nor new, but reflect longstanding policies applicable to
copyrights and other intellectual property rights.'75 To meet these warranty
obligations, a licensor must either own the intellectual property rights in the
licensed material or have the permission of the owner to use and sublicense
such rights. If neither is the case and the licensor does not use the licensed
rights itself, then a disclaimer of the two warranties makes sense because it
insulates the licensor from potential liability flowing from the licensee's use
of the licensed materials. However, in the case of web sites, where a WSO
uses the licensed material itself and can be held directly liable for copyright,
patent, trademark and trade secret infringement, a disclaimer of the
warranties of noninfringement and noninterference will not completely
insulate a WSO from liability. Although such a disclaimer may limit a web
site user's claims, it will not limit the claims of third parties who contend
their intellectual property rights have been infringed.
The second type of warranty listed in UCITA is the express
warranty. Express warranties arise from the affirmative representations and
promises of a warrantor. 76 As recognized in UCITA and Article 2 of the
U.C.C., however, they need not be contained in a warranty clause to be
enforceable. They can be contained in advertisements and other promotional
materials or in informational materials and instructions. 7 7 They can even be
reflected in samples, models and demonstrations. 78 As long as these
representations and promises form a part of the basis of the bargain, they are
enforceable as express warranties. Thus, where a WSO has made an express
promise, even if it is made inadvertently, it may be required to live up to that
promise even if all express warranties are disclaimed.
79
Another warranty mentioned in UCITA is the implied warranty for
informational content. This warranty arises under circumstances where a
licensee of information reasonably expects that the information provided is
"not made inaccurate because of the provider's lack of reasonable care in
performing the contract. ' ' 80 UCITA proposes to insulate most content
providers from responsibility for the accuracy of the information by narrowly
defining the warranty for informational content and allowing it to be
disclaimed.' 8' In states where UCITA has not been adopted, it remains to be
175 See3 NuIMER, supra note 40, §§ 10.11-10.13.
176 See UCITA § 402(a)(1) (2002); U.C.C. § 2-312 (2002).
177 See UCITA § 402(a)(2); U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(b).
171 See UCITA § 401(a)(3); U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c).
179 See supra note 38.
IS0 UCITA § 404 cmt. 2 (2002).
1"1 As defined by UCITA, the implied warranty for informational content only
applies to "a merchant that, in a special relationship of reliance with a licensee, collects,
compiles, processes, provides, or transmits informational content." UCITA § 404(a). It does
not apply at all to
(1) subjective characteristics of the informational content, such as
aesthetics, appeal, and suitability to taste;
(2) published informational content; or
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seen whether this warranty will be recognized and, if so, whether it will be
defined as narrowly as it is in UCITA. However, even under UCITA, when a
"merchant" makes specific promises concerning informational content, it is
required to exercise reasonable care to prevent inaccuracies. Thus, a WSO's
potential exposure for inaccuracies in web site content will depend, at least in
part, upon whether a promise to provide accurate information has been made
or can be inferred. But even without such a promise, WSOs have an interest
in avoiding defamation claims by exercising care not to post untruths about
others. Thus, whether a WSO disclaims the warranty for informational
content or not, it should still exercise reasonable care to ensure the accuracy
of the information about others that it posts.
The final UCITA-listed implied warranty that may be applicable to
web sites is the implied warranty of fitness for licensee's purpose.1
8 2
According to UCITA, this warranty arises when "a licensor has reason to
know of the licensee's particular purpose in the transaction and that the
licensee is relying on the licensor's expertise in selecting or developing
information suitable for that purpose."'8 3 This warranty, and attempts to
disclaim it, has its roots in the early days of software licensing when
licensees often harbored unrealistic expectations about the functions and
capabilities of software. As with the implied warranty for informational
content, whether such a warranty arises with respect to the operation of a
web site will depend on what a WSO represents about the functions and
(3) a person that acts as a conduit or provides no more than editorial
services in collecting, compiling, distributing, processing, providing, or
transmitting informational content that under the circumstances can be
identified as that of a third person.
UCITA § 404(b). "Published informational content" is defined to mean "informational content
prepared for or made available to recipients generally, or to a class of recipients, in
substantially the same form." UCITA § 102(a)(52) (2002). The stated intent of excluding
published informational content from the implied warranty for informational content .is to
ensure that it is treated in the same manner as print newspapers and books. UCITA § 404 cmt.
3b ("This Act treats published informational content that is computer information analogously
to print newspapers or books which are not exposed to contractual liability risks based on
mere inaccuracy; treating the computer informational content differently would reject the
wisdom of prior law.").
UCITA indicates that the warranty for informational content is derived from the
Restatement (Second) Torts section 552, which provides:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
1S2 UCITA § 405(a). Two other UCITA warranties, the implied warranty of
merchantability of computer programs and the implied warranty of system integration, are not
discussed herein because they apply to transactions involving software. See UCITA §§ 403,
405(c) (2002).
18' UCITA § 405 cmt. 2.
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capabilities of its site. A broad disclaimer of the warranty of fitness for
licensee's purpose will do no good if in other parts of a web site a WSO
makes promises that the web site will serve particular purposes. Thus, in
addition to disclaiming the warranty for licensee's purpose, WSOs should
use explanatory or instructional provisions to clearly explain the limited
purpose of their sites.
5. Efforts to Limit Damages
In addition to narrowly defining the scope of their services and
broadly disclaiming all warranties, WSOs often seek to limit their potential
liability by contractually restricting the scope of available damages in the
event of a breach of duty. These efforts typically include exculpatory clauses
and indemnification provisions.'" For instance, the TOU of Oracle contains
the following exculpatory clause:
IN NO EVENT SHALL ORACLE BE LIABLE FOR ANY
DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR DAMAGES FOR
LOSS OF PROFITS, REVENUE, DATA OR USE,
INCURRED BY YOU OR ANY THIRD PARTY,
WHETHER IN AN ACTION IN CONTRACT OR TORT,
ARISING FROM YOUR ACCESS TO, OR USE OF, THE
SITE18 5
The Oracle TOU also contains an indemnity provision, as follows:
You agree to defend, indemnify and hold harmless Oracle,
its officers, directors, employees and agents from and
against any and all claims, liabilities, damages, losses or
expense, including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs,
'u Liquidated damage provisions are typical in many contracts for the sale of
goods, including software licenses, but are not as common in TOUs. This most likely reflects
the fact that it is difficult to pre-determine the amount of loss occurring as a result of a breach.
See UCITA § 804 (2002) (discussing the requirements of an enforceable liquidated damages
clause).
Damages for breach of contract by either party may be liquidated by
agreement in an amount that is reasonable in light of:
(1) the loss anticipated at the time of contracting;
(2) the actual loss; or
(3) the actual or anticipated difficulties of proving loss in the event of
breach.
UCITA § 804(a). See also U.C.C. § 2-718 (2002). It may also reflect the fact that, although
WSOs post TOUs in order to be able to argue that web site owners are contractually bound
thereby, with respect to potential breaches by web site users, WSOs would prefer the remedies
that are available under principles of tort law and pursuant to various intellectual property
statutes.
185 Oracle, Terms of Use, supra note 80, 8.
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arising out of or in any way connected with your access to or
use of the Site.
Exculpatory clauses seek to limit or extinguish potential liability by,
for instance, specifying the types of damages that are not recoverable in the
event of a breach of contract or by stating that a party will not be liable for
certain torts.18 7 Pursuant to an indemnification clause, a WSO does not
disclaim liability for its own wrongs but seeks to impose a contractual duty
on web site users to reimburse it for any damage claims or defense costs that
it incurs as a result of the actions of web site users.' 8
Public policy often trumps exculpatory clauses and indemnification
provisions.'8 9 Sometimes the public policy limitations are expressed in
specific statutes.' 90 Other times, courts will refuse to enforce exculpatory
clauses because they conflict with established law.' 9' Indemnification clauses
suffer from an additional weakness; they are only beneficial if the indemnitor
can be identified and sued and if he has the financial resources to pay the
indemnitee. Moreover, because WSOs are likely to be viewed as the "deep-
pocket," such provisions will not prevent WSOs from being sued in the first
instance.
Including damage limitation clauses in TOUs is generally advised
but the ultimate effectiveness of exculpatory clauses and indemnification
provisions will depend on whether they are enforceable. Generally, the
enforceability of such provisions depends on applicable public policy and
how broadly the clauses are written. In order to enhance the effectiveness of
such clauses it is recommended that they be written in a way that reflects the
actual relationship between the parties and that web site users be given
186 Id. 9.
187 See generally 2 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 34, ch. 22, "Exculpatory
Contracts."
'S8 Id. § 20:4 ("A party may expressly agree to indemnify another for future
damages. Such agreements are not against public policy, and are similar to an insurance
agreement, with the indemnitee in the position of the insured.").
189 See generally 2 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 34, ch. 22; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). The Oracle TOU itself recognizes that exculpatory
clauses will not be enforced in all cases: "SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE
LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY. ACCORDINGLY, SOME OF THE
ABOVE LIMITATIONS MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU." Oracle, Terms of Use, supra note 8,
18.
190 See generally 2 LEE & LrnDAHL, supra note 34, § 20:4 (noting that several
states have enacted statutes which make indemnity agreements in the construction industry
void); Id. § 22:2 ("Exculpatory contracts are not warmly received by the courts as a whole...
and many states have statutes nullifying them.").
'9' Id. § 22:2 ("It is well established that one may not by contract exculpate
himself or herself from liability for willful and wanton conduct or gross negligence.").
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adequate advance notice of the potential financial obligations being imposed
upon them by such clauses.
192
6. Dispute Resolution Provisions
One of the most difficult issues facing e-commerce participants
concerns the global nature of the Internet and the fact that, if they are
prudent, WSOs must worry about the laws of all states and countries where
they conduct business.' 3 To some degree WSOs can limit problems by
limiting the geographic scope of their targeted sales activities. 94 But if they
want to take full advantage of the markets that the Internet opens up to them,
they must prepare for the possibility of being sued in distant locales. A way
to reduce this risk is to include forum-selection, choice-of-law, and
arbitration clauses in TOUs.' 95 The TOU of Barnes and Noble contains a
very WSO-friendly version of a forum-selection and choice-of-law
provision:
This site is created and controlled by barnesandnoble.com in
the State of New York. As such, the laws of the State of
New York will govern these disclaimers, terms and
conditions, without giving effect to any principles of
conflicts of law. barnesandnoble.com reserves the right to
make changes to its site and these disclaimers, terms and
conditions at any time. User hereby irrevocably and
192 See generally Steven B. Lesser, How to Draft Exculpatory Clauses That Limit
or Extinguish Liability, 75-Nov FLA. B.J., Nov. 2001, at 10 (discussing how Florida courts
interpret exculpatory language).
193 The problem was explained in a recent article as follows:
If a consumer purchases goods online, what law should apply to the
transaction, and which jurisdiction will adjudicate any subsequent
dispute? In many cases, the consumer will not know whether the website
she has just accessed is "located" on a server just down the street or on a
different continent (and indeed a single website may have elements that
reside on multiple servers in multiple locations). For example, if a French
consumer accesses a "Swedish" website, has she somehow "entered"
Sweden for purposes ofjurisdiction and choice of law?
Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. Rv. 311, 332 (2002).
194 This result flows from the fact that it is generally recognized that a person or
company cannot be sued in a locale where it does not have a sufficient presence or "minimum
contacts." In the United States, this principle is based on concepts of due process as explained
in the famous case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Of course,
not all countries have the same concept of due process as the United States and may apply the
general principle differently. See generally Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279 (1983). Thus,
even the strategy of setting up separate web sites for different countries with different rules
applicable to each may not insulate a WSO from litigation in a distant locale for what was
thought to be purely U.S. based activity. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 193 ,at 337-40
(discussing the lawsuit brought against Yahoo in France based on an alleged violation of a
French law that prohibits the sale of Nazi memorabilia).
195 See generally WNN & WRIGHT, supra note 24, §§ 3.05, 3.06.
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unconditionally consents to submit to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of the State of New York and of the
United States of America located in the State of New York
for any litigation arising out of or relating to use of or
purchase made through bamesandnoble.com (and agrees not
to commence any litigation relating thereto except in such
courts), waives any objection to the laying of venue of any
such litigation in the New York Courts and agrees not to
plead or claim in any New York Court that such litigation
brought therein has been brought in an inconvenient
forum.
96
An example of an arbitration clause is set forth in Amazon's TOU:
Any dispute relating in any way to your visit to
Amazon.com or to products you purchase through
Amazon.com shall be submitted to confidential arbitration in
Seattle, Washington, except that, to the extent you have in
any manner violated or threatened to violate Amazon.com's
intellectual property rights, Amazon.com may seek
injunctive or other appropriate relief in any state or federal
court in the state of Washington, and you consent to
exclusive jurisdiction and venue in such courts. Arbitration
under this agreement shall be conducted under the rules then
prevailing of the American Arbitration Association. The
arbitrator's award shall be binding and may be entered as a
judgment in any court of competent jurisdiction. To the
fullest extent permitted by applicable law, no arbitration
under this Agreement shall be joined to an arbitration
involving any other party subject to this Agreement, whether
through class arbitration proceedings or otherwise. 1
97
In the absence of binding dispute resolution clauses, a well-
established body of law exists to answer jurisdictional and choice of law
questions.'9 The court in which litigation is commenced will decide whether
19 Barnes & Noble, Terms of Use, supra note 5, 8.
197 Amazon, Conditions of Use, supra note 5.
'98 In the U.S. this includes state long-arm statutes, principles of constitutional
law, case decisions, and the First and Second Restatements of Conflict of Laws. For example,
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that in the absence of an agreement
between the parties, "[t]he rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract
are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the transaction . RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 188 (1971).
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it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute and what law will apply to determine its
outcome. Dispute resolution provisions are designed to add more
predictability to the process by resolving forum and choice-of-law issues pre-
dispute. For this reason, they are generally recommended. However, even
where dispute resolution clauses are alleged to exist, the court where an
action is initiated will still need to determine if the underlying contract is
enforceable and what law should apply on the issue of enforceability.1 99
Depending on the nature of the dispute, the public policy interests of a forum
state may dictate that the lawsuit be heard in that forum despite contractual
200provisions to the contrary.
In order to enhance the enforceability of dispute resolution
provisions in TOUs it is generally recommended that they be drafted in an
equitable manner and that their contents be fully disclosed to web site
users.2 0' Although WSOs obviously are inclined to draft forum-selection and
choice-of-law clauses to require consumers to bring suit where they are
located, before deciding if a forum-selection clause is needed, WSOs should
consider the nature and value of the claims that may be brought against them
and whether it is more economical to allow certain claims to be litigated
where a web site user is located. The enforceability of arbitration clauses will
depend upon the nature of the claims sought to be arbitrated and the fairness
of the arbitration process.0 2 Based upon the result of Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., the more costs and inconvenience that dispute resolution clauses
impose on consumers, the less likely they are to be enforced.0 3
In the international realm, answers to jurisdiction and choice-of-law questions are
found in the laws of various countries and in various international agreements including the
Brussels Convention, the Rome Convention and the Vienna Convention.
199 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd 306 F. 3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). In Specht, a federal judge sitting in New
York considered a lawsuit brought by plaintiffs who resided in a number of different states
against a Delaware corporation that maintained its principal place of business in California. Id.
at 591. Applying the choice-of-law rules of New York, the court held that California had the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties and, therefore, that California
law would apply on the question of whether a browse-wrap agreement allegedly entered into
between the parties was enforceable. Id.
200 This is most likely to occur where the lawsuit is based upon a tort claim or
where a significant number of a forum state's citizens have been harmed by the alleged
wrongdoin" Kaustuv M. Das, Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and
Browsewrap Agreements And The "Reasonably Communicated" Test, 77 WASH L. REv. 481
(2002).
202 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83
(Cal. 2000) (detailing circumstances under which agreement to arbitrate statutory rights will
be enforced under California law); see also Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 89-91 (2000) (noting that although the Federal Arbitration Act evinces a strong
public policy in favor of the enforcement of arbitration clauses, they will not be enforced if
they are precluded by a federal statute or, in the case of claims based on statutory rights, if
they are ineffective to protect such rights).
203 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) ("Excessive fees, such as those
incurred under the ICC procedure, have been grounds for finding an arbitration provision
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IV. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF TERMS OF USE AGREEMENTS
Regardless of the purpose and intent of a TOU, it is largely
meaningless if it is not enforceable. 204 As a preliminary matter, the
enforceability of a TOU will depend upon whether it meets the classic
requirements of a binding contract: (1) parties capable of contracting; (2)
mutual assent; and (3) consideration.25 Additionally, since TOUs are a type
of standard-form contract that are not bargained for, they are likely to be
scrutinized to determine if they are unconscionable or otherwise against
public policy.20 6 Of course, how these requirements and limitations are
interpreted and applied will depend upon the court in which enforcement is
sought and what laws are applied to determine the enforceability of the
contract.
2°7
Much of the discussion surrounding the enforceability of shrink-
wrap, click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements has focused on the issue of
mutual assent.20? Early on, cases such as Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.
unenforceable or commercially unreasonable."). The plaintiffs in Brower complained that the
costs of arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) far exceeded the
amount of their damage claims, and therefore, amounted to no remedy at all. Id. at 571.
204 As is discussed throughout the article, even if a TOU is not enforceable it may
serve a number of useful purposes due to its educational function. See supra Section III.A.
Also, although a TOU may not be enforceable, it may nonetheless convince a large number of
people to comply with its provisions. Finally, in particularly egregious cases, courts may be
willing to find a contract in order to justify an injunction against a bad actor. For example, see
Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), in which the court enforced
a browse-wrap agreement against a business that had accessed publicly available information
from a web site in a manner that the court deemed unacceptable.
20 17A Am. JuR. 2D Formation of Contracts §16 ("[In order to form a valid
contract there must be the mutual assent of two or more persons competent to contract,
founded on a sufficient and legal consideration, to perform some legal act or to omit to do
something, the performance of which is not enjoined by law.").
206 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (2002).
207 Generally, in all states of the United States except Louisiana, contracts for the
sale of goods are governed by the U.C.C., Article 2. For transactions not covered by the
U.C.C., including those involving the provision of services, common law principles as
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts are likely to govern. In Virginia and
Maryland, the UCITA governs contracts involving computer information.
If a web site is intended for an international audience, a prudent company should
also consider the laws of every country where the web site will be actively used and promoted
but, at a minimum, must determine if the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (hereinafter the "CISG"), the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law of Electronic Commerce (hereinafter the
"Model Law"), available at http://www.uncitral.org/englishltexts/electcom/ml-ec.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2003), and the Council Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of
Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19, are applicable.
208 See generally WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 24, §6.02[A] (discussing potential
problems with the enforceability of shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and webwrap contracts); see also
Kunz et al., supra note 13.
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209 and Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology210 recognized the
problems inherent in purported agreements that are neither seen nor read by a
consumer before a sales transaction is consummated. But not all courts share
this view. In both ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg] I and Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc. ,212 the Seventh Circuit enforced shrink-wrap agreements that were not
disclosed to the consumers before the exchange of money. Relying on
U.C.C. section 2-204(1), the court in Zeidenberg noted that the buyer of the
software accepted the terms of the contract in the manner invited by the
seller, i.e., by using the software after having an opportunity to read the
license at his leisure."' Thus, as long as the purchaser of the goods had the
ability to reject the terms of the shrink-wrap agreement and return the goods,
it did not matter to the court when the terms were presented.
Extrapolating from the reasoning of Zeidenberg, many
commentators believe that click-wrap agreements are enforceable provided
that the recipient of the form agreement has advance notice of its
existence." 4 Further strengthening this argument is the fact that, unlike
shrink-wrap agreements, the recipient of a click-wrap agreement is typically
required to "click" on an "I agree" icon as part of a registration process,
thereby affirmatively manifesting assent.2" The same arguments, however,
Efforts are currently underway by various groups to devise legal arguments and
strategies that will enhance the enforceability of click-wrap agreements. The development of
the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA) is one example of this effort.
Section 114 of UCITA deals with pretransaction disclosures in "Intemet-type" transacations
and states that a "licensor affords an opportunity to review the terms of a standard form
license" if, among other possible means, it discloses "the standard terms in a prominent place
on the site from which the computer information is offered and promptly fumish[es] a copy..
• on request before the transfer of the computer information . . . ." However, UCITA is far
from uniform in its application because, to date, it has only been adopted by two states.
209 655 F. Supp. 750, 761 (E.D. La. 1987), aff'd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
210 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
211 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
212 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1996).
213 86 F.3d at 1452.
214 See, e.g., Holly K. Towle, Mass Market Transactions in the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, 38 DUQUESNE L. REv. 371 (2000); Kunz et al., supra note 13;
see also I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass.
2002) (enforcing click-wrap license agreement); In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litigation,
No. 00C1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (finding click-wrap agreement
enforceable); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. App. Div. 1999)
(assuming click-wrap agreement enforceable without discussing the issue); Hotmail Corp. v.
Vans Money Pie, Inc., 1998 WL 388389, 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998)
(enforcing click-wrap agreement).
215 One of the ironies of the Internet is that computers make it easier for
manufacturers of goods, services and computer information to distribute terms of sale
agreements and obtain assent before a sale actually occurs. But the manufacturers and
distributors of goods, services, and computer information are reluctant to slow down the speed
of online transactions by requiring consumers to actually see the terms ahead of time.
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cannot be made with respect to the typical browse-wrap TOU.216 Unlike a
click-wrap agreement, if a manifestation of assent to a browse-wrap
agreement exists at all it is not the result of an affirmative act but can only be
inferred from inaction.2 17 Additionally, although TOUs are generally
accessible as a link from a WSO's home page, there is no guarantee that they
are noticed, let alone read, by web site users.21 8 To the extent a web site user
has no understanding that the mere act of logging onto a site is obligating
him to a lengthy contract with potentially severe consequences, there is an
obvious unfairness to the assertion that an agreement exists. 2'9 Finally,
unlike the software licensing transactions that were involved in the foregoing
cases, the operation of a web site is not subject to the U.C.C. and, thus, the
more liberal principles of assent that are reflected in the U.C.C. will only be
applied by analogy, if at all.220
216 Typically, WSOs seek to bind web site users to browse-wrap agreements by
stating in a TOU that the mere act of searching a site constitutes assent to the TOU. For
instance, Amazon's TOU provides: "If you visit or shop at Amazon.com, you accept these
conditions." Amazon, Conditions of Use, supra note 5. This statement does not appear
automatically on the home page of Amazon.com, but is resident on another page that must be
linked to by web site users.
For a discussion of the inherent weaknesses of browse-wrap agreements and how
they differ from shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements, see Jennifer Femminella, Note,
Online Terms and Conditions Agreements: Bound By the Web, 17 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 87 (2003).
The ABA Working Group on Electronic Contracting Practices initiated a project in
2002 entitled "Electronic Non-Negotiated Contracts without Clear and Unambiguous Assent
('Browse-wrap Agreements')" (hereinafter referred to as the "ABA Project"). According to
the working group, the project "builds on last year's ABA project published in the November
2001 issue of the Business Lawyer that proposed fifteen strategies for transactional lawyers to
help their clients to avoid disputes about the validity of the assent process in a 'click-through
agreement."' ABA Project (on file with author), available in upcoming Nov. 2003 edition of
BUSINESs LAWYER. The project regarding "browse-wrap" agreements is described as a
"tougher related project." Id. For a discussion of the fifteen strategies proposed in the earlier
ABA project, see Kunz et al., supra note 13.
217 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 525390, at *3, 54
U.S.P.Q. 1344 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), in which, on a motion to dismiss, the court held
that: "It cannot be said that merely putting the terms and conditions in (small print at the
bottom of a home page] necessarily creates a contract with any one using the web site."
218 See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000), in which
the court expressed concern about the enforceability of a browse-wrap agreement in a case
brought by the purported licensor for an alleged breach of the confidentiality provisions of the
agreement. But see Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y 2000),
where the court found assent in a similar action brought by the purported licensor for the
alleged breach of the restrictions on use provisions of a browse-wrap agreement.
219 As for the potentially severe consequences that may befall unsuspecting web
site users, consider that provisions of a TOU that purport to define certain information as trade
secrets and limit a web site user's "authorized" access to the site may subject the web site user
to criminal liability under the Federal Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839
(2000), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
220 The application of the UCC has expanded our collective conception
of a contract in many ways, including the most fundamental understanding
of what a contract is and how it operates. In general, contracts are easier to
HAMLINE LA WREVIEW
As a practical matter, the precise terms of a browse-wrap TOU will
also have a bearing on its enforceability. The more unfair contractual
provisions seem, the less likely courts are to enforce them. While courts can
invalidate such provisions under principles of unconscionability, they may
also find a lack of mutual assent. Indeed, one way to reconcile the divergent
shrink-wrap cases is to consider the contractual provisions that were at
issue.22 For instance, the contractual provision involved in Hill was an
arbitration clause that arguably did not adversely affect the merits of the
consumers' underlying claims. 2 In contrast, the contract involved in Step-
Saver sought to modify the licensee's rights by disclaiming all express and
implied warranties under circumstances where express warranties had
apparently been given.223 The holding in Specht v. Netscape Communications
Corp. refusing to enforce an arbitration provision is explained, at least in
part, by the egregious nature of the provision. In that case, the arbitration
clause not only required the consumer to submit to arbitration in the location
of the licensor's principal place of business, but also required the losing party
to pay all costs of arbitration. 24
Based on principles of freedom of contract and in the interests of
judicial economy, courts are generally inclined to enforce dispute resolution
provisions.225 In fact, the Federal Arbitration Act specifically provides that a
form under the UCC, and impose a broader range of obligations than a
contract under the common law.
While the common law requires the parties to exchange
communications that constitute the offer and acceptance, under the UCC,
the parties' conduct may form a contract.
Jane M. Rolling, The UCC Under Wraps: Exposing the Need for More Notice to Consumers
of Computer Software with Shrinkwrapped Licenses, 104 COM. L.J. 197, 204-05 (1999). As
noted by the appellate court in Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., while U.C.C.
Article 2 has often been applied to the licensing of tangible software, there is considerable
doubt whether it will be applied to the licensing of downloadable software. 306 F.3d at 29 n.
13. This fact, coupled with amendments to Article 2 of the U.C.C. which expressly exclude
"information" from the definition of "goods," supra note 172, explains the impetus behind
UCITA. Without UCITA, contracts involving transactions in information, including the online
licensing of software, will be subject to common law principles that are arguably less
supportive of the seller and licensor.
221 The differences in results may also be explained by the fact that the laws of
different states were applied and, although there is a general understanding of what constitutes
mutual assent, the application of that understanding from state-to-state may differ.
222 Hill, 105 F.3d 1147.
223 939 F.2d at 96.
224 150 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
225 See, e.g.,Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991)
(enforcing a forum-selection clause printed on the back of a ticket for a cruise).
[A] clause establishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the
salutary effect of dispelling any confusion about where suits arising from
the contract must be brought and defended, sparing litigants the time and
expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct forum and conserving
judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those
motions.
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written agreement containing an arbitration clause is "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the
revocation of any contract.,2 26 Under traditional contract theory, however,
there are a number of circumstances where such clauses will not be enforced.
First, they will not be enforced if they are not part of a binding contract. The
court in Specht refused to compel arbitration because the contract in which
the arbitration clause was contained was not assented to by the plaintiffs.
227
Also, as noted in Specht, dispute resolution clauses will not be enforced if
they were not reasonably communicated to the offeree.228 Finally, such
clauses, and indeed all contractual provisions, will not be enforced if they are
unconscionable.
Under the doctrine of unconscionability, a court will refuse to
enforce a contract or specific terms of a contract if it is deemed unfair.229
Usually, courts examine both the procedural and substantive fairness of a
contract to determine if it is unconscionable.230 Procedural unconscionability
Id. But note that the court in Carnival based its decision on federal law and was
careful to limit its ruling to the admiralty action that was before it. Id. at 590. The
court also noted that it was not addressing the question of whether the plaintiffs had
adequate notice of the forum-selection clause because plaintiffs conceded that they
had notice. Id.
226 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
227 150 F. Supp. 2d at 596 ("The case law on software licensing has not eroded the
importance of assent in contract formation. Mutual assent is the bedrock of any agreement to
which the law will give force. . . . Because the user Plaintiffs did not assent to the license
agreement, they are not subject to the arbitration clause contained therein and cannot be
compelled to arbitrate their claims against the Defendants.").
228 Noting that "California courts carefully limit the circumstances under which a
party may be bound to a contract," the court in Specht quoted the following language from
Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 993 (1972):
[A]n offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not
bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he is unaware,
contained in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.... This
principle of knowing consent applies with particular force to provisions
for arbitration.
Specht, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 595. See also Das, supra note 201.
229 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 206, at 456.
The unconscionability doctrine, embodied in section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) on sales of goods and liberally applied by
courts to other types of contracts, allows courts to strike contracts or terms
in order to prevent 'oppression and unfair surprise.' The doctrine
obviously affords courts considerable discretion to strike unfair terms
directly rather than covertly by stretching less-applicable rules in order to
reach a fair result.
Id. See also Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the
Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 NEw MEXICO L. REv. 359, 361 (2001) ("Two centuries before
the Uniform Commercial Code made the unconscionability doctrine available at law, the
courts had woven public policy and ideas from equity and tort into innovative principles that
would save consumers from unfair bargains.").
230 See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573 ("As a general
matter, under New York law, unconscionability requires a showing that a contract is 'both
2003]
HAMLINE LA WREVIEW
examines the circumstances surrounding contract formation while
substantive unconscionability looks at the actual terms of the contract.23 ' As
the court in Brower noted, the purpose of the doctrine is "to ensure that the
more powerful party cannot 'surprise' the other party with some overly
oppressive term., 232 Given that the mutual assent of a web site user to a
browse-wrap TOU is marginal at best, and that in many cases a web site user
will not have seen the TOU, the procedural unfairness of browse-wrap TOUs
is clear. To minimize the successful application of the unconscionability
defense with respect TOUs, care must therefore be taken to ensure that they
are at least substantively fair.
Finally, as is discussed throughout this article, there are a number of
public policy reasons why a TOU may not be enforced. While freedom of
contact is a highly valued concept in American jurisprudence, courts can, and
often do, refuse to enforce contractual provisions that conflict with public
policy.233 Most obviously, if a statute forbids a particular contractual
provision it will be declared void.234 But courts may also refuse to enforce
contractual provisions that violate common law policies.2"
V. CONCLUSION
There are many possible benefits to TOUs but the magnitude of the
benefits depends upon the nature of the relationship between the WSO and
the likely and intended users of the web site. It also depends on the content
of the web site. TOUs that fulfill disclosure requirements that are mandated
by law are obviously necessary in order to comply with the law. Similarly,
TOUs that are designed to take advantage of statutory limitations on liability,
to preclude the creation of an implied license, or to give notice of rights as
necessary to trigger damage claims and injunctive relief are also useful. But
TOUs that are designed to alter default rules which exist under applicable
procedurally and substantively unconscionable when made."'). But see Swanson, supra note
229, at 393 ("While many jurisdictions adhere to the language requiring the presence of both
components, the growing trend has been to employ either a sliding scale analysis or to allow
one element to suffice if the unfairness was sufficiently strong.").
2' Swanson, supra note 229, at 365-66.
232 676 N.Y.S.2d at 569 (citing State v. Avco Fin. Serv. of New York, Inc., 406
N.E.2d 1075, 1078 (N.Y. 1980).
233 The principle of freedom of contract rests on the premise that it is in
the public interest to accord individuals broad powers to order their affairs
through legally enforceable agreements. In general, therefore, parties are
free to make such agreements as they wish, and courts will enforce them
without passing on their substance. Occasionally, however, a court will
decide that this interest in party autonomy is outweighed by some other
interest and will refuse to enforce the agreement or some part of it.
2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 5.1.
2UId.
235 Id. § 5.2.
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contract, tort and intellectual property principles may be unnecessary and
unenforceable.
Because the legal issues that faced the emerging software industry
are different from the legal issues that face many WSOs today, software
licenses are not a good model for TOUs. For one thing, in contrast to the
relationship that exists between a software companyand its licensees, the
relationship between a WSO and a web site user is not necessarily ongoing.
In the absence of an ongoing relationship, detailed contractual provisions
designed to govern future activities are unnecessary.236 Secondly, where the
uncertainties in the law regarding computer software related to applicable
means of intellectual property protection, the principal uncertainties
regarding the Internet and e-commerce relate to the communicative and
cross-border nature of the medium. Third, in contrast to the state of the law
that existed in the 1960's and 1970's when the software license was
invented, more laws and case decisions now exist to answer Intemet-related
uncertainties.
In designing a TOU, web site owners can use software licenses as a
checklist of the issues that should be addressed. But the rote application of
software license terms to TOUs does not make sense without a proper
account of the particular needs of individual WSOs. Judging from existing
TOUs, the copying of software licenses often leads to lengthy agreements
that can best be characterized as prophylactic measures that may fail in their
essential purpose because they contain surprising and unfair terms that are
unlikely to be enforced. To the extent they also create a false sense of
security in a WSO that prevents it from taking other steps to protect its
interest (for instance, by purchasing insurance or ordering its business
practices so as to obtain more traditional contractual agreements), they may
do more harm than good.
In designing a TOU, web site owners are well-advised to consider
TOUs as just one of several possible tools that help to define their rights,
limit their liability and establish their relationship with their customers.
Clearly, they are not a substitute for intellectual property protection. They are
also not a substitute for wise and fair business practices.
236 UCITA apparently recognizes this fact by excluding "casual exchanges of
information" from its scope and by distinguishing between "computer information
transactions" that have "computer programs" as their subject matter and those that concern
"access and Internet contracts." See UCITA § 103 cmts. 2-3 (2002). However, the term
"casual exchanges of information" is not included as a specific exclusion in section 103 and is
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